Actors of instability

PAKISTAN’S security indicators have been improving lately, mainly due to the state’s enhanced counterterrorism efforts. Government and security officials highlight gains on the counterterrorism front; statistics support their claims. However, that does not mean we have won the war. We still need to develop effective ideological and political responses to broaden and strengthen the ongoing counterterrorism campaign.

During the last two weeks, the security and law-enforcement agencies claimed some significant successes. ISPR chief Lt Gen Asim Bajwa revealed that a network of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) had been busted in Karachi.

Karachi police and the Sindh Counterterrorism Department claimed the killing of some wanted terrorists and the arrest of Asif Chotu, head of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Al Almi, who reorganised the violent sectarian group, from Dera Ghazi Khan. Several other alleged terrorists have been either killed or arrested across the country in recent weeks. That indicates that the law-enforcement agencies have stepped up their campaign to dismantle terror networks in urban areas.

Sectarian groups are only one pillar of the existing terrorism infrastructure.

Most of the militants arrested in recent weeks and months belong to the LeJ. It seems that the law enforcers are focusing more on sectarian terrorist outfits and their allies. Definitely, it will contribute to further decreasing sectarian-related terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The year 2015 saw a 60pc decrease in such attacks compared with 2014. These efforts will also weaken sectarian groups’ nexus with different Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) factions and the latter’s support networks in Pakistan.

However, Pakistan’s militant landscape is very diverse with multiple actors of instability at work. Sectarian terrorist groups are only one pillar of the existing terrorism infrastructure, which will take time to perish. Though a few other groups have also been weakened, their support bases and operational capabilities remain intact.

A review of the statistics of 2015 suggests that the TTP remained the major actor of instability, carrying out 212 terrorist attacks across the country. The group also managed to carry out 12 cross-border attacks from Afghanistan. The TTP splinter group Jamaatul Ahrar further fuelled instability by carrying out 28 terrorist attacks.

Another tribal areas-based group, the Lashkar-i-Islam, was involved in 27 attacks in Khyber Agency and the suburbs of Peshawar. The small militant groups in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Fata, described as the local Taliban, carried out 56 terrorist attacks in 2015. Meanwhile, while LJ was involved in 33 attacks in 2015; the Shia sectarian group Sipah-i-Mohammad Pakistan also remained active during the year, mainly in Karachi, Quetta and Islamabad-Rawalpindi, and carried out 19 targeted killings. Baloch separatist groups were another key actor of instability, mainly in Balochistan.

In recent years, new actors have been emerging and some old groups are taking advantage of the changes. Affiliates of the militant Islamic State (IS) group accepted responsibility for three attacks, while Jundullah managed four high-intensity attacks in different parts of the country. AQIS also absorbed the human resource of weakening militant groups; it was involved in abduction cases in Pakistan.

In this context, the responses of the law-enforcement agencies need a dedicated platform to scientifically monitor the changing behaviours, trends, and emerging operational patterns of groups involved in terrorism. This initiative will help them broaden their threat perception and evolve effective responses.

So far, it has been difficult for the security and law-enforcement agencies to think beyond established threats. Pakistan is a frontline state in the war against terrorism, but Al Qaeda has never been on its threat-perception radar. Instead, the group was always considered part of a global problem, which resulted in the emerging threats being deemed insignificant.

The same is proving true for the IS, which is now transforming local terrorist groups. It is a real and emerging threat for Pakistan. Understanding the dynamics, including the erosion of conventional militant groups like the Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) and the banned Jaish-e-Mohammad is also a difficult task.

Interestingly, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, while denying the presence of IS in Pakistan, has claimed that banned groups like JuD are using the name of Daesh (Arabic acronym of IS) to mask their activities. The minister has always been reluctant to include the group on the list of banned outfits and his new statement indicates the confusion which persists within the security establishment about the status of certain militant groups. The problem with the government is that it does not consider a group a threat unless it is involved in terrorist activities inside the country.

But at least it has been acknowledged that banned militant groups have become recruiting bases for international terrorist organisations, including Al Qaeda and the IS.

The successes of law-enforcement agencies deserve commendation, but it has been seen in the past that the elimination of a terrorist group’s leadership did not completely crush the group. After a while, the group reorganised and nurtured a new leadership. It happened more than twice in the case of the LJ. The killing of LJ leaders, including its founder Riaz Basra in 2002, provided a brief lull in sectarian killings. But in 2004, a new wave started which receded in 2008 when its new leaders were killed.

Yet again, a sudden rise in sectarian killings was observed in 2010 when a new leadership, including Asif Chotu and Naeem Bukhari, took over the group. This leadership proved more lethal, as it had not only expanded the group’s geographical outreach to interior Sindh but also found new targets, including the Hazara and Ismaili communities, and the Bohra community in Karachi.

The relief in statistics provides an opportunity to the government and law-enforcement agencies to review their responses and recompose their operational strategies. The most important aspect is linked to how to intervene in the spaces that continue breeding new generations of terrorists. Both the politico-ideological and operational perspectives are important and need collaborative efforts.

The actors of instability use ideological and political spaces to survive, which automatically create the spaces for their operational activities.

By Muhammad Amir Rana, a security analyst. He is the Director of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1242368

Related :

Jihad, Extremism

The real War against Terror is the war of Ideology, Narrative, Discourse

The closer you want to get to eradicating the menace of terrorism, the bigger this menace 
seems to get. After the attack in Peshawar, our leaders,  deliberated and deliberated. But this
piece is not about them and the solutions they might come up with. It is about the sociology of 
the mindset that either justifies or rationalises terrorism, or impedes tangible action against it. It is about the failure of the state and the society to come up with a narrative that can defeat the terrorists.
Terrorists of all hues — ISIS, [Daesh] Al Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and its 
countless affiliates, Afghan Taliban and its affiliates. India-focused terror groups like
 Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and sectarian terror groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi — use two 
weapons: incredible hatred towards their victims and a narrative to convince and recruit
 new supporters to the cause. Keep Reading >>>>>>

Related :

Jihad, Extremism

Non implimentaion of Sharia , Ruler and Islam (Urdu)

شریعت نافذ نہ کرنے والا حکمران اور دائرئہ اسلام!

عراق کے شہر کوفہ کی جامع مسجد میں حضرت علیؓ کے گھر کا دروازہ کھلتا تھا۔ امیر المؤمنین یہیںسے مسجد میں تشریف لایا کرتے تھے۔ سترہ رمضان کو جب آپ فجر کی نماز پڑھانے گھر کے دروازے سے مسجد میں داخل ہوئے اور انہیں دیکھتے ہی نماز کے قیام کی تکبیر بلند ہوئی تو شبیب ملعون نے تلوار کا وار کر دیا۔ امیرالمؤمنینؓ گر پڑے تو ملعون ابن ملجم مرادی تیزی سے آگے بڑھا،حملہ آور ہوا تو حضرت علیؓ کے سر مبارک اور ماتھے پر تلوار کا وار پڑا۔ حملہ کرتے ہوئے ملعون نے جو جملہ کہا وہ قابل غور ہے۔ کہنے لگا: ''اَلْحُکْمُ لِلّٰہِ لَا لَکَ یَا عَلِیْ وَلَا لِاَصْحَابِکَ‘‘ اے علی حکم اللہ کا ہے، نہ تیرا ہے اور نہ تیرے ساتھیوں کا ہے (تاریخ ابن خلدون ج 2ص 617) قارئین کرام! غور فرمایئے! حضرت علیؓ نبوی راستے پر قائم خلیفہ راشد ہیں۔ ان کی حکمرانی میں کامل طور پر شریعت کا قانون نافذ تھا۔ اس کے باوجود اس دور کے خارجیوں نے ان پر معاذ اللہ، اللہ کی حاکمیت سے نکل جانے کا الزام عائد کر دیا اور کفر کا فتویٰ لگا کر گردن زدنی قرار دے دیا اور پھر شہید کرتے ہوئے اپنے تکفیری اور خارجی نظریے کے حامل نعرے کا اعلان بھی کر دیا۔ اس سے اندازہ لگایا جا سکتا ہے کہ باقی حکمرانوں کی ان کے ہاں کیا حیثیت ہو گی؟ خاص طور پر آج کے مسلم حکمرانوں کو ایسے خارجی لوگ کیا سمجھیں گے، بخوبی اندازہ لگایا جا سکتا ہے۔ اب ہم ان کی گمراہ سوچ کا جائزہ لیں گے کہ کتاب و سنت کی روشنی میں ایسی رائے اور سوچ کی کیا حیثیت ہے؟ 

سب سے پہلے ہم ان آیات کا ترجمہ لکھ رہے ہیں، جن کو سامنے رکھتے ہوئے خارجی ذہنیت کے لوگ مسلمان حکمرانوں کو کافر قرار دے کر دائرئہ اسلام سے خارج کرتے ہیں اور پھر مرتد ہو جانے کا فتویٰ لگا کر گردن زدنی قرار دیتے ہیں، پھر بغاوت کرتے ہوئے عسکری گروپ تشکیل دیتے ہیں اور حملے کر کے ارتداد کی سزا دیتے ہوئے خوش ہوتے ہیں کہ انہوں نے قرآن پر عمل کر دیا ہے۔ اللہ فرماتے ہیں: اور جو لوگ اللہ کے اتارے ہوئے احکامات کے مطابق فیصلے نہ کریں وہی کافر ہیں۔ (المائدہ: 44) اسی طرح اگلی آیت میں اللہ نے ایسے لوگوں کو ظالم قرار دیا اور پھر اسی سورت کی آیت نمبر 47میں اللہ تعالیٰ نے ایسے لوگوں کو فاسق قرار دیا۔

قارئین کرام! سورۃ المائدہ جس میں مندرجہ بالا تین آیات موجود ہیں وہاں اللہ تعالیٰ نے یہودیوں اور مسیحی لوگوں کا تذکرہ کیا ہے اور ان پر اتاری گئی الہامی کتابوں تورات اور انجیل کا ذکر فرمایا ہے۔ ان آیات کی شرح اور تفسیر میں بخاری اور مسلم کی جو احادیث ہیں، مفسرین نے ان کا تذکرہ کیا ہے۔ ہم طوالت کے خوف سے وہ احادیث درج نہیں کر رہے۔ مفسرین نے ان کا ذکر کر کے یہی بتلایا ہے کہ یہودیوںنے رجم کی سزا کو بھی بدل دیا تھا اور قتل کے بدلے میں دیت کی رقم میں بھی امتیاز قائم کر دیا تھا کہ طاقتور اگر کمزور قبیلے کے شخص کو قتل کر دیتا تو دیت یعنی خون بہانے کی رقم آدھی لی جاتی تھی اور اگر کمزور کے ہاتھوں طاقتور قبیلے کا آدمی قتل ہو جاتا تو خون بہا یعنی دیت کی پوری رقم وصول کی جاتی تھی۔ یہ طرزِ عمل تورات میں درج قانون کے صریحاً خلاف تھا لہٰذا اللہ تعالیٰ نے ایسی تبدیلی کرنے والوں کو کافر، ظالم اور فاسق کہا اور یہ تبدیلی کرنے والے یہودونصاریٰ کے علماء اور حکمران تھے۔ نیز ان کے کفر کی سب سے بڑی اور بنیادی وجہ تو یہ تھی کہ تورات اور انجیل میں حضرت محمد کریمﷺ کا واضح ذکر تھا کہ آپ آخری رسولؐ ہیں، اس کے باوجود ان لوگوں نے تورات اور انجیل کی بات کو نہیں مانا اور اس سلسلے میں بھی تبدیلی اور تحریف کی اور حضورؐ کی نبوت و رسالت کا انکار کر دیا۔ یہ تھا ان کے کفر کا اصلی اور بنیادی سبب۔ چنانچہ اللہ کے رسولؐ کے معروف صحابی حضرت براء بن عازبؓ واضح کرتے ہیں کہ کافر، ظالم اور فاسق قرار دینے والی تینوں آیات کا تعلق ''ہی فِی الْکُفَّارِ کُلِّھَا‘‘ سب کا سب غیر مسلم لوگوں سے ہے۔ (مسند احمد: 18724)

قارئین کرام! مندرجہ بالا تینوں آیات کی تفسیر معلوم کرنے کے لئے جب ہم نے تفسیر ابن کثیر کو دیکھا تو امام ابن کثیر رحمہ اللہ آگاہ فرماتے ہیں کہ بڑے بڑے صحابہؓ جن میں حضرت براء بن عازب، حضرت حذیفہؓ بن یمان اور حضرت عبداللہ بن عباسؓ جیسے مفسر کہ جن کے فہم قرآن میں اضافہ کے لئے اللہ کے رسولؐ نے دعا فرمائی وہ سب یہی فرماتے ہیں کہ کافر والی آیت اہل کتاب کے بارے میں نازل ہوئی ہے۔ بعد کے مفسرین اور موجودہ دور کے نامور مفسرین بھی اپنی تفاسیر میں اسی مؤقف کا اظہار کرتے اور لکھتے نظر آتے ہیں۔ حضرت عبداللہ بن عباسؓ مزید فرماتے ہیں کہ جو شخص اللہ کے نازل کردہ حکم کو ماننے سے انکارکر دے اس نے کفر کیا اور وہ حکمران جو اقرار کرتا ہے مگر اللہ کے نازل کردہ احکام کے مطابق فیصلے نہیں کرتا، تنقید نہیں کرتا، وہ ظالم اور فاسق ہے۔ ثابت ہوا موجودہ حکمران جو شریعت کے مطابق فیصلے نہیں کرتے، تنفیذ نہیں کرتے، وہ گنہگار ہیں۔ ظلم کا ارتکاب تو کرتے ہیں، فسق یعنی گناہ سے دوچار تو ہوتے ہیں مگر مسلمان ہیں۔ خارجی لوگ یا خارجی ذہنیت سے متاثر لوگ جو ایسے گنہگار حکمرانوں کو کافر قرار دیتے ہیں وہ جہالت، لاعلمی اور حماقت کا اظہار کرتے ہیں۔ اور خارجیوں کا طرز عمل یہی ہے کہ وہ مسلمانوں کو گناہوں کی وجہ سے کافر قرار دے دیتے ہیں اور دائرئہ اسلام سے فوراً باہر کر دیتے ہیں۔ ایسے لوگوں کے بارے میں امام محمد بن اسماعیل بخاری رحمہ اللہ اپنی صحیح بخاری میں آگاہ کرتے ہیں کہ وہ آیات جو کافروں سے متعلق ہیں بعض لوگ ان آیات کو مسلمانوں پر لاگو کر دیتے ہیں اسی سے فتنہ پیدا ہوتا ہے۔

قارئین کرام! قرآن و حدیث کے مطابق اسلاف کا طریقہ یہ ہے کہ گناہ گار مسلمان حکمرانوں کو نصیحت کی جائے، ان کا احترام ملحوظ خاطر رکھتے ہوئے انہیں سمجھایا جائے، اللہ کا خوف دلایا جائے۔ آج کے دور میں یہ بھی کہا جا سکتا ہے کہ پرامن احتجاج کر لیا جائے، کالم اور کتابیں لکھی جائیں، ملاقات کر کے اپنا فرض ادا کیا جائے جیسا کہ قیام پاکستان کے بعد ہمارے علماء کرتے آئے ہیں لیکن کفر کے فتوے لگانا، بغاوت کرنا اور عسکری گروپ بنا کر حملے کرنا یہ خارجیت ہے اور دہشت گردی کی بدترین روش ہے۔ یہ بغاوت ہے اور اسے کچلنا اور اس کی سرکوبی کرنا مسلمان حکمرانوں کی ڈیوٹی ہے، شرعی فریضہ ہے۔ وہ یہ شرعی فریضہ ادا نہ کریں گے تو گناہ گار ہوں گے۔ مسلمانوں کی ریاست، ان کی حفاظت اور جان ومال سب فتنے سے دوچار ہو جائیں گی لہٰذا ضرب عضب بالکل درست فیصلہ ہے۔ اس فیصلے سے خارجی فتنے کا قلع قمع ہوا ہے۔ دنیا میں میاں نوازشریف اور پاک فوج کے سالار راحیل شریف کے کردار کو نیک نامی ملی ہے

- See more at: http://dunya.com.pk/index.php/author/ameer-hamza/2016-01-22/14107/50330002#tab2

Related :

Jihad, Extremism

The Muslim Extremist Discourse: Constructing Us Versus Them

This unique book analyzes the discourse of militant organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda. It interrogates the discourse of these extremist organizations, which publish their own newspapers. These publications, widely distributed to the local population, play a critical role in securing and maintaining public support for the militant organizations. The book examines how these organizations discursively construct the socio-political reality of their world, in the process defining the Self and the Other. The Self becomes umma, or the global Muslim community, while the Other becomes the West, including the United States, Israel, and India. This book presents an analysis of three historical moments the assassination of al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden, the controversial YouTube video Innocence of the Muslims, and the shooting of the Pakistani child activist and Nobel Laureate Malala Yousafzai. This analysis reveals the discursive strategies used by the militant organizations to create what Foucault calls regimes of truth and articulate identities of the Self and the Other. The first of its kind, this book provides an insight into the mind-set of extremists. It presents a picture of the world that extremists construct through their own discourse and explains how extremists try to win the hearts and minds of mainstream Muslims in order to expand their support base, seek donations, and find new recruits. Understanding extremist narratives and the ways they feed the broader militant discourse may yield more meaningful and effective strategies for the West to communicate with mainstream Muslims."
"The Muslim Extremist Discourse: Constructing Us Versus Them" By Faizullah Jan
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1026947/the-militant-discourse/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The militant discourse

By Ayesha Siddiqa

The Chinese want foolproof security to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The primary reason being, the protection of their citizens. Since Beijing tends to use its own manpower for all the projects it is involved in with hardly any share in employment for Pakistan, security is of prime importance. But China has less to worry about as the militant and religious right wing in Pakistan views it far more kindly than it does the West. In fact, it is rare to come across any mention of China in right-wing publications despite the knowledge that Muslims in Xinjiang are not the happiest in the world and face tough conditions.

Interestingly, Pakistan’s militant and right-wing media in general focuses on the West as an enemy. According to Faizullah Jan, who teaches at Peshawar University and has come out with a fantastic study of militant discourse in the country, the West is perceived as the “far enemy”, which is out there to destroy Muslims, especially of Pakistan. In his recently published book, The Muslim Extremist Discourse, he has looked at the extremist’s conceptualisation of the self and the other in the war on terror. Jan has systematically examined numerous publications of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the Jamaatud Dawaa (JuD) to understand their worldview as reflected in the debate over three events: a) the operation to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad; b) the ban on YouTube in Pakistan due to the presence of an anti-Islam film on the website; and c) the shooting of Malala Yousufzai. The author has correctly pointed out the significance of narratives, which are critical tools to create a social reality that is then marketed amongst the clientele of a group or party.

It is important to examine the extremist discourse because not only is it a good measure to gauge the perspective of militants, it also fosters the realisation, as Jan points out, that this narrative will exist beyond the end of the war on terror. In fact, this literature is central to radicalism, which feeds violent extremism in the country and amongst Muslim communities. But this literature is not exclusive as it is not present in total isolation from the mainstream media discourse (particularly in Urdu), which has begun to echo an almost similar perspective on numerous issues, certainly on the three events cited above.

One of the key points of extremist literature is focused on presenting the West as the negative, the enemy or the ‘other’ that must be fought. This is a common theme that runs through the description and debate over the three events, which Jan categorises as ‘three moments’. Hence, we see that despite some of the jihadi media’s initial reaction of even sympathising with Malala Yousufzai after the attack on her or reminding people that Islam forbids attacks against women and children, the tone changes quickly and she begins to be presented as an enemy agent or as an excuse used by Americans to attack Muslim Pakistan. The shift in how an event is portrayed is also obvious from how OBL’s killing is described. While the initial reaction is to deny that such a thing ever happened, this is followed by a tirade against the US. Later, OBL’s killing is described as the epitome of martyrdom and his description then takes the form of myth-building in which he is presented as Arab royalty, who like Buddha, abandoned the comforts of his home and hearth to lay down his life in order to protect Islam. Furthermore, OBL is also likened to a Sufi and majnun (a great lover). Referring to similarities with historical characters, is done as part of necessary myth-building that gives the believer a feeling of reliving the early days of Islam. One wonders if that is because Muslims of the subcontinent were, historically, converts from Buddhism, Hinduism or Sikhism and that is why the image of historical characters is sometimes resurrected like deities. Every other militant appears to take the name of a companion of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) or the early commanders of Islam to give him a sense of being part of history.

A parallel theme that we see running through publications like the Urdu daily Jasarat, the JeM’s Al-Qalam and Zarb-e-Momin, the JI’s daily Islam, the JuD’s Jarrar, or Al-Rashid Trust’s Al-Amin is the presentation of rulers and the leadership as the ‘near enemy’. According to Jan’s analysis, the theme of financial, political and moral corruption of rulers is a pervasive one. Not that militants have to struggle a lot to convince their readers of this, but there is a very systematic description of rulers as people ‘who have sold out their conscience for dollars’, and help the US ‘violate our sovereignty by carrying out drone attacks’. Although not mentioned by Jan, a large part of the same literature denounces democracy as an unacceptable and corrupt system. The hatred for democracy, in fact, is a common thread which runs through the literature produced by al Qaeda, JuD and JeM. The religious wings and sectarian groups, which these violent extremists are ideologically linked with, have a similar narrative. But more importantly, liberal intellectuals in Muslim countries are also equated with the ‘near enemy’, and hence a threat to Muslim identity.

The natural progression of the above argument is the enforcing of a caliphate that would represent the rule of believers. The denunciation of the existing political system is critical in establishing logic for a utopia, based on an Islamic system that espouses the idea of justice for all. Therefore, the identity of the ‘favoured’ Muslim and the militant is crafted carefully. This was most obvious from the way in which militant literature hid the identity of those who attacked Malala Yousufzai. This was to ensure that any sympathy for the young girl may not turn people against the Taliban who had attacked her.

Interestingly, despite the common threads found in all extremist discourse, the Pakistani state tends to distinguish between the good and the bad extremist. Such an attitude ignores the power of discourse and how it is changing the way people think about the ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies and friends. The need for a counter-narrative is urgent.
By Ayesha Sidiqah
Tribune Express

War Against Militant Islam- the Ideological Frontiers

  

It all started in 1979 when the then Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. The US, the rival superpower, engaged the local traditional Muslims and many others who volunteered from outside Afghanistan to fight the invading army to throw them out. In the process they trained the local people in the art of modern military warfare, equipped them with military hardware, and called them the Afghan fighters of the holy war (Afghan Mujahidin). The US achieved its purpose of ousting USSR from Afghanistan culminating in the collapse of the Soviet empire. Both parties, the US and Afghan Mujahidin, were supremely confident that since they had defeated a super power, they had become invincible. In this war, they were ably supported by Pakistan who provided them the ideology, the manpower and the training ground for these Mujahidin.

The Afghan Mujahidin did not fight the Soviet army for the love of Americans. Their fight was a holy war for them which had its roots in their religious narrative that urged them to fight non-Muslim enemies until the entire globe was conquered for establishing the political authority of Islam. Not long after the collapse of Soviet Union, the Taliban established the first model of what they thought was the ideal Islamic state in accordance with their narrative. When a group of people caused 9/11 to happen and the US invaded Afghanistan on the plea that the alleged chief instigator, Osama bin Laden, was given protection by the Taliban government, the religious narrative was challenged. The Taliban took it as a further opportunity to realize their ideal. From then on, they are fighting, going by their religious understanding, the Kafir Americans who conquered their land and destroyed the Islamic regime in Afghanistan. Their first goal is to oust the Americans from Afghanistan and the next, bigger one, is to convert the entire globe into an Islamic state by invading it through Jihad (holy war). The fallout of that war in Pakistan is not coincidental. TTP is the Pakistani version of the group inspired by the same ideology.

The narrative the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani counterparts are striving to realize is taught in the religious seminaries of Pakistan in a way that the Muslim world is described as Darul-Islam (or Darul-Salam, the land of peace) and the rest as Darul-Harb (the land of war). This war will continue according to the narrative until all territories of the world are subjugated and made Darul-Islam. A similar narrative was forcefully presented by Mawlana Maududi and his followers and Dr Israr Ahmad in the later half of the twentieth century. They quoted verses after verses from the Qur’an to show that the purpose of a believer’s life in this world was to ensure supremacy of God’s law over the entire globe. His task would remain incomplete until that goal is realized. Neither of them wanted their narrative to be realized through military adventurism of such devastating proportions as the TTP is doing. In fact, Jama’at e Islami decided after the creation of Pakistan to achieve that goal democratically. Dr Israr Ahmad resigned from the Jama’at in protest, declaring it as a deviation from the ideal Mawlana Maududi himself presented. No matter what these scholars had in mind, military adventurism of the Taliban has its ideological roots in their works.

The soldiers who are fighting for TTP are therefore convinced that what they are doing is the noblest of the causes their religion has taught them. They are engaged in a holy war (Jihad). But the narrative is not believed in by the Taliban alone. A substantial number of religious Pakistanis are influenced by the same approach. The non-combatant sympathizers are put off sometimes by the barbaric killing of the innocent civilians by the Taliban. Many of them also disagree with suicide bombing as a tactic for achieving this goal. Some also dispute their strategy of achieving their end by fighting fellow Muslims. But the ideal of ensuring supremacy of Islamic law one way or the other is shared by many as an undisputed ideal.

The war against the Taliban is therefore not going to be a simple affair. It has both military and ideological dimensions. The latter too has to be fought resolutely by presenting convincing arguments to show that the concept of Darul Harb is absurd, dangerous, and un-Islamic. It needs to be clarified that the battles fought against the non-believers at the time of the Prophet alaihissalam were mostly divine punishments for the people who rejected the messenger of God despite knowing him to be the true representative of God. The Qur’anic verses referring to those battles have nothing to do with later times. 

It also needs to be clarified that the task of introducing Islamic Shari’ah is not the direct responsibility of the masses. The elected representatives need to introduce it through mutual consultation. Muslims need to be convincingly reminded that fighting against Muslim rulers is not Jihad (a holy war); instead, it is fasad fil ard (mischief on earth). And above all, they should be made to realize that killing one soul is as big a crime as killing the entire humanity. Arguments for all these ideas are firmly rooted in the Qur’an.

If the outcome of the war against TTP is to be positive, it will have to be fought as much on the ideological frontier as it needs to be fought on the military front. No army can fight a war convincingly if it is fighting an enemy who enjoys considerable sympathies of many of its own soldiers and civilians.

By Dr.Khalid Zaheer: http://blog.khalidzaheer.com/201/war-militant-islam-ideological-frontiers

Related :

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• Ideological Confusion - The biggest problem of Muslims & solution (Urdu with English Translation)
• The Muslim Extremist Discourse: Constructing Us Versus Them
• War Against Militant Islam- the Ideological Frontiers  

• The real War against Terror is the war of Ideology, Narrative, Discourse 

• Non implimentaion of Sharia , Ruler and Islam (Urdu) 

• [شریعت نافذ نہ کرنے والا حکمران اور دائرئہ اسلام!]
• ISIS, Daesh, Boko Haram, Taliban - Illogical Logic of Terrorists to kill innocent people on name of Islam - Refuted:  
• The Dreadful Doctrine of Terror : Takfeer عقيدة المروعة من الإرهاب: التكفير  
• Fighting Terrorism: In the name of narratives  
• Genesis of Terror & Road to Peace