اور جو کوئی مسلمان کو جان بوجھ کر قتل کرے، اس کی سزا دوزخ ہے۔ جس میں وہ ہمیشہ رہے گا اور اس پر اللہ کا غضب ہوگا۔ اور اللہ اس پر لعنت کرے گا اور اس نے اس کے لیے عذاب عظیم تیار کر رکھا ہے۔ (قران:4:93) او څوک چې یو مسلمان په لوی لاس (عمدي) ووژني، نو د هغه سزا دوزخ دی، چې تل به پکې وي او پر هغه باندې د الله غضب دی او الله پرې لعنت کړی او د هغه لپاره یې لوی عذاب تیار کړی دی. (سورت النساء، ایت: ۹۳)
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National Narrative Against Terrorism دہشت گردی کے خلاف قومی بیانیہ تاریخی فتویٰ ’’پیغام پاکستان‘‘
National Narrative Against Terrorism دہشت گردی کے خلاف قومی بیانیہ تاریخی فتویٰ ’’پیغام پاکستان‘‘ تمام مسالک ک...
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شدت پسندوں کی تقسیم Categories of Terrorists nd Reforming
Saturday, December 17, 2016
Facilitators of Terrorists خوارج اور سہولت کار
بعض لوگ خوارج کے بارے میں نرم گوشہ رکھتے ہیں اور انہیں برا نہیں جانتے، جب کہ بعض لوگ اس سے بھی ایک قدم آگے بڑھتے ہوئے خوارج کی پشت پناہی اور support کرتے ہیں اور اپنے طرز عمل سے شرپسندوں اور دہشت گردوں کی حوصلہ افزائی کرتے ہیں، اُن کے لیے ماسٹر مائنڈ (master mind) کا فریضہ سرانجام دیتے ہیں اور ان کی مالی و اخلاقی معاونت (financial & moral support) کرکے انہیں مزید دہشت پھیلانے کی شہ دیتے ہیں، یہ عمل بھی انتہائی مذموم ہے۔
خوارج کی پشت پناہی کرنے والوں کے لیے قَعْدِيَۃ (عملاً بغاوت میں شریک نہ ہونے والے کی) اصطلاح استعمال کی جاتی ہے۔
شارح صحیح البخاری حافظ ابن حجر عسقلانی لکھتے ہیں:
’’والقعدية‘‘ قوم من الخوارج، کانوا يقولون بقولهم، ولا يرون الخروج بل يزينونه.
(عسقلاني، مقدمة فتح الباري: 432)
’’اور قَعْدِيَۃ خوارج کا ہی ایک گروہ ہے۔ یہ لوگ خوارج جیسے عقائد تو رکھتے تھے مگر خود مسلح بغاوت نہیں کرتے تھے بلکہ (وہ خوارج کی پشت پناہی کرتے ہوئے) اسے سراہتے تھے۔‘‘
حافظ ابن حجر عسقلانی مقدمۃ فتح الباری میں ایک اور مقام پر لکھتے ہیں:
والخوارج الذين أنکروا علی علي رضی الله عنه التحکيم وتبرء وا منه ومن عثمان رضی الله عنه وذريته وقاتلوهم فإن أطلقوا تکفيرهم فهم الغلاة منهم والقعدية الذين يزينون الخروج علی الأئمة ولا يباشرون ذلک.
(عسقلاني، مقدمة فتح الباري: 459)
’’اور خوارج وہ ہیں جنہوں نے حضرت علی رضی اللہ عنہ کے فیصلۂ تحکیم (arbitration) پر اعتراض کیا اور آپ رضی اللہ عنہ سے، حضرت عثمان رضی اللہ عنہ سے اور ان کی اولاد و اَصحاب سے برات کا اظہار کیا اور ان کے ساتھ جنگ کی۔ اگر یہ مطلق تکفیر کے قائل ہوں تو یہی ان میں سے حد سے بڑھ جانے والا گروہ ہے جبکہ قَعْدِيَۃ وہ لوگ ہیں جو مسلم حکومتوں کے خلاف مسلح بغاوت اور خروج کو سراہتے اور اس کی حوصلہ افزائی کرتے ہیں، لیکن خود براہ راست اس میں شامل نہیں ہوتے۔‘‘
اِسی طرح حافظ ابن حجر عسقلانی اپنی ایک اور کتاب ’’تھذیب التھذیب‘‘ میں خوارج کی پشت پناہی کرنے والوں کے بارے میں لکھتے ہیں:
’’والقعد‘‘ الخوارج کانوا لا يرون بالحرب، بل ينکرون علی أمراء الجور حسب الطاقة، ويدعون إلی رأيهم، ويزينون مع ذالک الخروج، ويحسنونه.
(عسقلاني، تهذيب التهذيب، 8: 114)
’’اور قَعْدِيَۃ (خوارج کی پشت پناہی کرنے والے) وہ لوگ ہیں جو بظاہر خود مسلح جنگ نہیں کرتے بلکہ حسبِ طاقت ظالم حکمرانوں کا انکار کرتے ہیں اور دوسروں کو اپنی فکر و رائے کی طرف دعوت دیتے ہیں اور اس کے ساتھ ساتھ مسلح بغاوت اور خروج کو (مذہب کا لبادہ اوڑھا کر) سراہتے ہیں اور دہشت گرد باغیوں کو اِس کی مزید ترغیب دیتے ہیں۔‘‘
شارح صحیح البخاری حافظ ابن حجر عسقلانی کے درج بالا اقتباسات سے یہ حقیقت آشکار ہوتی ہے کہ قَعْدِيَۃ بھی خوارج میں سے ہی ہیں۔ لیکن یہ گروہ کھل کر اپنی رائے کا اظہار نہیں کرتا اور پسِ پردہ رہ کر خوارج کی باغیانہ اور سازشی سرگرمیوں کے لیے منصوبہ بندی (planning) کرتا ہے۔ گویا یہ گروہ ماسٹر مائنڈ کے فرائض سرانجام دیتا ہے۔ اِس گروہ کا کام دلوں میں بغاوت اور خروج کے بیج بونا ہے، خاص طور پر جب یہ گفتگو کسی ایسے فصیح و بلیغ شخص کی طرف سے ہو جو لوگوں کو اپنی چرب زبانی سے دھوکہ دینے اور اسے سنتِ مطہرہ کے ساتھ گڈ مڈ کرنے کی صلاحیت بھی
رکھتا ہو۔

Related :
Jihad, Extremism
Wednesday, January 13, 2016
The Muslim Extremist Discourse: Constructing Us Versus Them
This unique book analyzes the discourse of militant organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda. It interrogates the discourse of these extremist organizations, which publish their own newspapers. These publications, widely distributed to the local population, play a critical role in securing and maintaining public support for the militant organizations. The book examines how these organizations discursively construct the socio-political reality of their world, in the process defining the Self and the Other. The Self becomes umma, or the global Muslim community, while the Other becomes the West, including the United States, Israel, and India. This book presents an analysis of three historical moments the assassination of al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden, the controversial YouTube video Innocence of the Muslims, and the shooting of the Pakistani child activist and Nobel Laureate Malala Yousafzai. This analysis reveals the discursive strategies used by the militant organizations to create what Foucault calls regimes of truth and articulate identities of the Self and the Other. The first of its kind, this book provides an insight into the mind-set of extremists. It presents a picture of the world that extremists construct through their own discourse and explains how extremists try to win the hearts and minds of mainstream Muslims in order to expand their support base, seek donations, and find new recruits. Understanding extremist narratives and the ways they feed the broader militant discourse may yield more meaningful and effective strategies for the West to communicate with mainstream Muslims."
"The Muslim Extremist Discourse: Constructing Us Versus Them" By Faizullah Jan
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1026947/the-militant-discourse/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The militant discourse
By Ayesha Siddiqa
The Chinese want foolproof security to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The primary reason being, the protection of their citizens. Since Beijing tends to use its own manpower for all the projects it is involved in with hardly any share in employment for Pakistan, security is of prime importance. But China has less to worry about as the militant and religious right wing in Pakistan views it far more kindly than it does the West. In fact, it is rare to come across any mention of China in right-wing publications despite the knowledge that Muslims in Xinjiang are not the happiest in the world and face tough conditions.
Interestingly, Pakistan’s militant and right-wing media in general focuses on the West as an enemy. According to Faizullah Jan, who teaches at Peshawar University and has come out with a fantastic study of militant discourse in the country, the West is perceived as the “far enemy”, which is out there to destroy Muslims, especially of Pakistan. In his recently published book, The Muslim Extremist Discourse, he has looked at the extremist’s conceptualisation of the self and the other in the war on terror. Jan has systematically examined numerous publications of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the Jamaatud Dawaa (JuD) to understand their worldview as reflected in the debate over three events: a) the operation to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad; b) the ban on YouTube in Pakistan due to the presence of an anti-Islam film on the website; and c) the shooting of Malala Yousufzai. The author has correctly pointed out the significance of narratives, which are critical tools to create a social reality that is then marketed amongst the clientele of a group or party.
It is important to examine the extremist discourse because not only is it a good measure to gauge the perspective of militants, it also fosters the realisation, as Jan points out, that this narrative will exist beyond the end of the war on terror. In fact, this literature is central to radicalism, which feeds violent extremism in the country and amongst Muslim communities. But this literature is not exclusive as it is not present in total isolation from the mainstream media discourse (particularly in Urdu), which has begun to echo an almost similar perspective on numerous issues, certainly on the three events cited above.
One of the key points of extremist literature is focused on presenting the West as the negative, the enemy or the ‘other’ that must be fought. This is a common theme that runs through the description and debate over the three events, which Jan categorises as ‘three moments’. Hence, we see that despite some of the jihadi media’s initial reaction of even sympathising with Malala Yousufzai after the attack on her or reminding people that Islam forbids attacks against women and children, the tone changes quickly and she begins to be presented as an enemy agent or as an excuse used by Americans to attack Muslim Pakistan. The shift in how an event is portrayed is also obvious from how OBL’s killing is described. While the initial reaction is to deny that such a thing ever happened, this is followed by a tirade against the US. Later, OBL’s killing is described as the epitome of martyrdom and his description then takes the form of myth-building in which he is presented as Arab royalty, who like Buddha, abandoned the comforts of his home and hearth to lay down his life in order to protect Islam. Furthermore, OBL is also likened to a Sufi and majnun (a great lover). Referring to similarities with historical characters, is done as part of necessary myth-building that gives the believer a feeling of reliving the early days of Islam. One wonders if that is because Muslims of the subcontinent were, historically, converts from Buddhism, Hinduism or Sikhism and that is why the image of historical characters is sometimes resurrected like deities. Every other militant appears to take the name of a companion of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) or the early commanders of Islam to give him a sense of being part of history.
A parallel theme that we see running through publications like the Urdu daily Jasarat, the JeM’s Al-Qalam and Zarb-e-Momin, the JI’s daily Islam, the JuD’s Jarrar, or Al-Rashid Trust’s Al-Amin is the presentation of rulers and the leadership as the ‘near enemy’. According to Jan’s analysis, the theme of financial, political and moral corruption of rulers is a pervasive one. Not that militants have to struggle a lot to convince their readers of this, but there is a very systematic description of rulers as people ‘who have sold out their conscience for dollars’, and help the US ‘violate our sovereignty by carrying out drone attacks’. Although not mentioned by Jan, a large part of the same literature denounces democracy as an unacceptable and corrupt system. The hatred for democracy, in fact, is a common thread which runs through the literature produced by al Qaeda, JuD and JeM. The religious wings and sectarian groups, which these violent extremists are ideologically linked with, have a similar narrative. But more importantly, liberal intellectuals in Muslim countries are also equated with the ‘near enemy’, and hence a threat to Muslim identity.
The natural progression of the above argument is the enforcing of a caliphate that would represent the rule of believers. The denunciation of the existing political system is critical in establishing logic for a utopia, based on an Islamic system that espouses the idea of justice for all. Therefore, the identity of the ‘favoured’ Muslim and the militant is crafted carefully. This was most obvious from the way in which militant literature hid the identity of those who attacked Malala Yousufzai. This was to ensure that any sympathy for the young girl may not turn people against the Taliban who had attacked her.
Interestingly, despite the common threads found in all extremist discourse, the Pakistani state tends to distinguish between the good and the bad extremist. Such an attitude ignores the power of discourse and how it is changing the way people think about the ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies and friends. The need for a counter-narrative is urgent.
By Ayesha Sidiqah
Tribune Express
Friday, June 26, 2015
Left wing, right wing, broken wing: Short history of Terrorist Groups in Pakistan

Sunday, March 8, 2015
"Islamabad: from the outside" by Mirza Khurram Shahzad
:Sitting in the lap of the magnificent green Margallas, Islamabad`s E-7 sector normally remains calm and quiet through the day.
The only noticeable activity is usually the movement of monkeys on its northern service road or the noticeable presence of several vigilant security men keeping an eye on the villa of Doctor Abdul Qadeer Khan.
That changes when the students of madressah Jamia Faridia come out on to the streets in their spare time.
The madressah Jamia Faridia, built on the northern edge in the green area between sector E-7 and Marga11a hills, is Islamabad`s largest religious seminary. It was constructed with the blessings of former military dictator, General Zia ul Haq, in violation of the rules and regulations of the Capital Development Authority (CDA).
Around 1,500 students, enrolled in this seminary, flock out after Asar prayers to roam around in grounds, parks, streets and markets.
They have come from different parts of the country to seek religious education in this Deobandi seminary, where they also reside.
Jamia Faridia is affiliated with the Lal Masjid and was once administered by Ghazi Abdul Rasheed, who was killed in the military operation in 2007. It is currently being administered by Maulana Abdul Aziz.
The majority of these students are from the north-western areas outside Islamabad such asChitral, Batagram, Swat, the tribal areas and also villages around Abbottabad, Murree and Kashmir.
Abdullah and Muhammad are two friends who have come here all the way from Chitral to seek higher education in this seminary and have nothing to do in the evenings but to go out in the streets of Islamabad.
`We initially studied in a seminary in Chitral but then came here to Jamia Faridia, because no seminary was offering higher education in Chitral,` Abdullah says as he leaves the madressah after Asar prayers.
`We will have free time to spend and relax a bit until Maghreb prayers and then we will return to the seminary,` he said.
Around three miles cast of Jamia Faridia, in sector F-6, up to 800 students of Jamia Muhammadia occupy a park in front of the Super Market commercial centre.
Soon after Asar prayers, they come out in the park and rest on the swings, benches and grass patches, leaving no room for other kids, particularly the girls and women living in the flats adjacent to the park.
`There was no madressah in my village in Tarbela Ghazi, so my father sent me here to become an Aalim (religious scholar),` says 15-year-old Huzaifa, who is in the first year batch of Jamia Muhammadia.
Like Huzaifa, Abdullah and Muhammad, there are over 15,000 students who have come to Islamabad to study in its religious seminaries. Incomparison there are hardly any local students from Islamabad who have joined these madressahs.
Intriguingly, organisations of all sects have built large seminaries in the federal capital, but none have established madressahs of this level in the areas from where the students actually hail.
`More than 90 per cent students in the 375 madressahs of Islamabad come from other citics. But this is a stupid question as to why these students come to study here. Islamabad is a city of outsiders and people in all departments have come from other cities,` says Maulana Abdul Quddus, a spokesman for Wifaq-ul-Madaris Al Arabia in Islamabad.
`It`s the government`s duty to provide high grade madressahs and schools in every nook and corner of the country. If they cooperate with us and establish high standard madressahs in other cities and facilitate them, students will not come to Islamabad for religious studies,` he says.
But Muhammad, a final year student of Jamia Faridia, believes there are financial reasons behind this.
`There are madressahs in our area in Chitral but they are not of this high level. The religious scholars don`t establish high grade madressahs in remote areas because they collect more funds from cities like Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi.
Moreover, life is easy here,` he said.
According to government statistics, there are a total of 329 madressahs in Islamabad, out ofwhich 175 are registered. Up to 16,000 students study in these madressahs but no official data has been maintained about the students who come from other cities.
On the other hand, around 250,000 students study in 422 formal government schools and up to 300,000 in 2,000 private schools including the high standard private schools affiliated with foreign universities. But hardly any students come from other cities to study in these schools.
Pervez Hoodbhoy, a senior professor formerly associated with Islamabad`s Quaid-i-Azam University, says that while the state originally provided space to religious elements in the federal capital during Gen Zia`s regime, those elements have now become much stronger and bring in people from outside to increase their power.
`If`a molvi gets a residence in a house associated with a mosque or madressah on a prime location in a city like Islamabad, he then brings in more and more people from outside to strengthen his hold.
`Over the years, they have now strengthened their street power in Islamabad. They can close down the city whenever they want to, and they have become accustomed to using this tool to blackmail the authorities. This is the reason they don`t establish large seminaries in other cities and have made Islamabad as their headquarter.
`But this has sufTocated the city, particularly for women who can`t move freely in the areas where madressahs exist. And children of`ten can`t go to parks because these madressah students have occupied most of`those.
Hoodbhoy also said that the madressah students have also forcibly snatched the citizens right of freedom of assembly on various occasions.
`I remember when we protested against a terrorist attack on the Hazara community in Quetta in front of the National Press Club, Islamabad two years ago, these students armed with clubs, bats and iron rods came there and attempted to attack us. Police had to intervene to save the protesters.`
Islamabad: from the outside
by Mirza Khurram Shahzad, dawn.com
