اور جو کوئی مسلمان کو جان بوجھ کر قتل کرے، اس کی سزا دوزخ ہے۔ جس میں وہ ہمیشہ رہے گا اور اس پر اللہ کا غضب ہوگا۔ اور اللہ اس پر لعنت کرے گا اور اس نے اس کے لیے عذاب عظیم تیار کر رکھا ہے۔ (قران:4:93) او څوک چې یو مسلمان په لوی لاس (عمدي) ووژني، نو د هغه سزا دوزخ دی، چې تل به پکې وي او پر هغه باندې د الله غضب دی او الله پرې لعنت کړی او د هغه لپاره یې لوی عذاب تیار کړی دی. (سورت النساء، ایت: ۹۳)
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National Narrative Against Terrorism دہشت گردی کے خلاف قومی بیانیہ تاریخی فتویٰ ’’پیغام پاکستان‘‘
National Narrative Against Terrorism دہشت گردی کے خلاف قومی بیانیہ تاریخی فتویٰ ’’پیغام پاکستان‘‘ تمام مسالک ک...
Thursday, January 5, 2017
شدت پسندوں کی تقسیم Categories of Terrorists nd Reforming
Wednesday, January 13, 2016
The Muslim Extremist Discourse: Constructing Us Versus Them
This unique book analyzes the discourse of militant organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda. It interrogates the discourse of these extremist organizations, which publish their own newspapers. These publications, widely distributed to the local population, play a critical role in securing and maintaining public support for the militant organizations. The book examines how these organizations discursively construct the socio-political reality of their world, in the process defining the Self and the Other. The Self becomes umma, or the global Muslim community, while the Other becomes the West, including the United States, Israel, and India. This book presents an analysis of three historical moments the assassination of al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden, the controversial YouTube video Innocence of the Muslims, and the shooting of the Pakistani child activist and Nobel Laureate Malala Yousafzai. This analysis reveals the discursive strategies used by the militant organizations to create what Foucault calls regimes of truth and articulate identities of the Self and the Other. The first of its kind, this book provides an insight into the mind-set of extremists. It presents a picture of the world that extremists construct through their own discourse and explains how extremists try to win the hearts and minds of mainstream Muslims in order to expand their support base, seek donations, and find new recruits. Understanding extremist narratives and the ways they feed the broader militant discourse may yield more meaningful and effective strategies for the West to communicate with mainstream Muslims."
"The Muslim Extremist Discourse: Constructing Us Versus Them" By Faizullah Jan
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1026947/the-militant-discourse/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The militant discourse
By Ayesha Siddiqa
The Chinese want foolproof security to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The primary reason being, the protection of their citizens. Since Beijing tends to use its own manpower for all the projects it is involved in with hardly any share in employment for Pakistan, security is of prime importance. But China has less to worry about as the militant and religious right wing in Pakistan views it far more kindly than it does the West. In fact, it is rare to come across any mention of China in right-wing publications despite the knowledge that Muslims in Xinjiang are not the happiest in the world and face tough conditions.
Interestingly, Pakistan’s militant and right-wing media in general focuses on the West as an enemy. According to Faizullah Jan, who teaches at Peshawar University and has come out with a fantastic study of militant discourse in the country, the West is perceived as the “far enemy”, which is out there to destroy Muslims, especially of Pakistan. In his recently published book, The Muslim Extremist Discourse, he has looked at the extremist’s conceptualisation of the self and the other in the war on terror. Jan has systematically examined numerous publications of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the Jamaatud Dawaa (JuD) to understand their worldview as reflected in the debate over three events: a) the operation to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad; b) the ban on YouTube in Pakistan due to the presence of an anti-Islam film on the website; and c) the shooting of Malala Yousufzai. The author has correctly pointed out the significance of narratives, which are critical tools to create a social reality that is then marketed amongst the clientele of a group or party.
It is important to examine the extremist discourse because not only is it a good measure to gauge the perspective of militants, it also fosters the realisation, as Jan points out, that this narrative will exist beyond the end of the war on terror. In fact, this literature is central to radicalism, which feeds violent extremism in the country and amongst Muslim communities. But this literature is not exclusive as it is not present in total isolation from the mainstream media discourse (particularly in Urdu), which has begun to echo an almost similar perspective on numerous issues, certainly on the three events cited above.
One of the key points of extremist literature is focused on presenting the West as the negative, the enemy or the ‘other’ that must be fought. This is a common theme that runs through the description and debate over the three events, which Jan categorises as ‘three moments’. Hence, we see that despite some of the jihadi media’s initial reaction of even sympathising with Malala Yousufzai after the attack on her or reminding people that Islam forbids attacks against women and children, the tone changes quickly and she begins to be presented as an enemy agent or as an excuse used by Americans to attack Muslim Pakistan. The shift in how an event is portrayed is also obvious from how OBL’s killing is described. While the initial reaction is to deny that such a thing ever happened, this is followed by a tirade against the US. Later, OBL’s killing is described as the epitome of martyrdom and his description then takes the form of myth-building in which he is presented as Arab royalty, who like Buddha, abandoned the comforts of his home and hearth to lay down his life in order to protect Islam. Furthermore, OBL is also likened to a Sufi and majnun (a great lover). Referring to similarities with historical characters, is done as part of necessary myth-building that gives the believer a feeling of reliving the early days of Islam. One wonders if that is because Muslims of the subcontinent were, historically, converts from Buddhism, Hinduism or Sikhism and that is why the image of historical characters is sometimes resurrected like deities. Every other militant appears to take the name of a companion of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) or the early commanders of Islam to give him a sense of being part of history.
A parallel theme that we see running through publications like the Urdu daily Jasarat, the JeM’s Al-Qalam and Zarb-e-Momin, the JI’s daily Islam, the JuD’s Jarrar, or Al-Rashid Trust’s Al-Amin is the presentation of rulers and the leadership as the ‘near enemy’. According to Jan’s analysis, the theme of financial, political and moral corruption of rulers is a pervasive one. Not that militants have to struggle a lot to convince their readers of this, but there is a very systematic description of rulers as people ‘who have sold out their conscience for dollars’, and help the US ‘violate our sovereignty by carrying out drone attacks’. Although not mentioned by Jan, a large part of the same literature denounces democracy as an unacceptable and corrupt system. The hatred for democracy, in fact, is a common thread which runs through the literature produced by al Qaeda, JuD and JeM. The religious wings and sectarian groups, which these violent extremists are ideologically linked with, have a similar narrative. But more importantly, liberal intellectuals in Muslim countries are also equated with the ‘near enemy’, and hence a threat to Muslim identity.
The natural progression of the above argument is the enforcing of a caliphate that would represent the rule of believers. The denunciation of the existing political system is critical in establishing logic for a utopia, based on an Islamic system that espouses the idea of justice for all. Therefore, the identity of the ‘favoured’ Muslim and the militant is crafted carefully. This was most obvious from the way in which militant literature hid the identity of those who attacked Malala Yousufzai. This was to ensure that any sympathy for the young girl may not turn people against the Taliban who had attacked her.
Interestingly, despite the common threads found in all extremist discourse, the Pakistani state tends to distinguish between the good and the bad extremist. Such an attitude ignores the power of discourse and how it is changing the way people think about the ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies and friends. The need for a counter-narrative is urgent.
By Ayesha Sidiqah
Tribune Express
Sunday, March 8, 2015
One size may not fit all - by Hasan Abdullah
Only a few years ago, he was studying at a madressah. Then one day, his family was informed that he had died in a suicide bomb blast. He was the suicide bomber, as confirmed by the propaganda video recorded prior to the attack. His younger brother says the family is still finding it hard to come to terms with the incident.
`He was funny. He used to make others laugh and was known in his friends circle as a champion of the game of snake on the mobile phone,` says his brother Amin. Their real names have been withheld upon their request.
So was it the madressah that turned a jolly young man into a suicide bomber`? His family appears reluctant to answer this question. `We don`t really know,` says Amin`s father.
Some religious-political parties such as Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam have been trying to play down the role of religious seminaries in fostering extremism, with their representatives sometimes making outlandish claims of entirely denying any role of seminaries in the radicalisation of people.
Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan says the overwhelming majority of madressahs have nothing to do with violence in the country. While that may be the case with the majority, there is little doubt about the dubious role of some madressahs in promoting militancy.
`It is a fact that some religious seminaries are acting as a supply line of suicide bombers. They may say that their `produce` is just for Afghanistan but once out of the conveyor belt, one doesn`t always have control over where the bomber ends up,` says Tariq Habib, a journalist who has reported on militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
On top of that, Habib says, there is `inherent sectarianism in the curriculum. Madressahs can deny as much as they want, but if you go through their fatwas, it is clear that they have declared many Muslim sects as disbelievers. From there starts the legitimisation of their killing.
Nearly seven decades after the creation of Pakistan, the leadership has for the first time, formulated a National Internal Security Policy (NTSP) that seeks to `protect national interests of Pakistan by addressing critical security issues as well as concerns of the nation. It is based upon principles of mutual inclusiveness and integration of all national effort.
According to Saleem Safi, a senior journalist and Islamist militancy expert, the task is far more difficult than perceived. `Real challenge for the NISP and the political leadership is to construct a national narrative. It is very difficult to bring a society, divided on multiple lines, under one narrative on terrorism and extremism.Raza Rumi, Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, says the government has much to do when it comes to reforming madressahs.
`There are three issues of main importance: first the registration and regulation. They have to adhere to a regulatory framework. Second, the curricula that needs to be updated and modernised. No point in teaching Fatawa-i-Alamgiri or such other outdated texts. More importantly, sectarian hate that goes into teaching has to be curbed and discontinued.
Third pertains to foreign students and teachers that become part of madressah networks without the necessary permission of the State,` says Rumi. He says that for madressah reform two imperatives need to be considered: first, the `extremist mindset flows out of the theological interpretations which are man-made and sectarian and they need regulation and debate. Second, terrorist activity is limited to only a few. And in the past the Pakistani state has used them as recruitment grounds for jihad abroad. These places and handlers are well-known and can be nabbed.
However, scores of teachers and students at various madressahs have expressed frustration at what they view as being singled out and targeted for their beliefs.
`The 21st amendment clearly discriminates between religious and secular elements of the society. Even on the streets, we are noticing the change in attitude of policemen who use derogatory language and try to humiliate every bearded person,` says Mufti Muhammad Zubair, Naib Muhtamim (Vice Principal) at Jamia Suffa in Karachi.
Bilal Hashim Siddiqui is a marketing graduate from Institute of Business Administration in Karachi. He is currently pursuing religious studies at Dar ul Uloom in Gulshan-i-Iqbal area of Karachi. He agrees with Rumi`s call for a debate but says `the secular elite do not have the moral and intellectual courage to have an honest debate` with Islamists.
`The media and the state have been suppressing any hon-est discussion on Islam. They want to regulate the debate in such a way that Islamists have to stay within the pre-defined, narrow framework set or rather imposed by the secularists.
They want us to debate Islam by judging it according to the secular value-systems,` says Siddiqui.
`It seems the government has little understanding of the nature of the conflict and it`s simply playing on some impressive buzzwords like madressah reforms, deradicalisation, counter-terrorism, secularisation and many more. These labels may be sellable when it comes to securing international funding but does not really bc1p in dealing with the challenges at hand. If anything, our society is getting increasingly polarised and that is not good,` says Sib Kaifee, an Islamabad-based security consultant who has acted as an advisor at some diplomatic missions as well.
A number of analysts seem to agree with some of the grievances coming out of madressahs.
`Government policies need a balance where every segment of society must be taken on board. Unfortunately, it seems that government policies are tilted towards the secular and liberal segment of society. I fear an Egypt-like polarisation if this trend continues. If the state fails to keep a balance then this type of polarisation may lead the society to violent confrontation,` says Abdullah Khan, director of the Conflict Monitoring Centre in Islamabad.
The government, however, appears confident that things are on the right track.
`A unity has been formed. You should not lose sight of this. The terrorists` strength has finally been broken,` says Minister for State and Frontier Regions retired Lt. Gen Abdul Qadir Baloch.
But Rumi warns against any misadventures.
`It would be unwise for the state to isolate millions of students and their families. Therefore the reform has to be debated and those who advocate violence need to be identified and proceeded against under the law,` he says.But Sib Kaif`ee sees a more l`undamental challenge.
`Clearly we have a significant number of people who do not even recognise the law of` the land and the system in place. Some of them vocally express their opposition while others are acting like sleeper cells waiting to explode. So instead of further polarising society, our mainstream media really needs to open up a debate on Islam and secularism. If` we want to promote certain values then we need to convince the people about the superiority of our ideas,` he asserts.
One size may not fit all - by Hasan Abdullah, dawn.com
"Islamabad: from the outside" by Mirza Khurram Shahzad
:Sitting in the lap of the magnificent green Margallas, Islamabad`s E-7 sector normally remains calm and quiet through the day.
The only noticeable activity is usually the movement of monkeys on its northern service road or the noticeable presence of several vigilant security men keeping an eye on the villa of Doctor Abdul Qadeer Khan.
That changes when the students of madressah Jamia Faridia come out on to the streets in their spare time.
The madressah Jamia Faridia, built on the northern edge in the green area between sector E-7 and Marga11a hills, is Islamabad`s largest religious seminary. It was constructed with the blessings of former military dictator, General Zia ul Haq, in violation of the rules and regulations of the Capital Development Authority (CDA).
Around 1,500 students, enrolled in this seminary, flock out after Asar prayers to roam around in grounds, parks, streets and markets.
They have come from different parts of the country to seek religious education in this Deobandi seminary, where they also reside.
Jamia Faridia is affiliated with the Lal Masjid and was once administered by Ghazi Abdul Rasheed, who was killed in the military operation in 2007. It is currently being administered by Maulana Abdul Aziz.
The majority of these students are from the north-western areas outside Islamabad such asChitral, Batagram, Swat, the tribal areas and also villages around Abbottabad, Murree and Kashmir.
Abdullah and Muhammad are two friends who have come here all the way from Chitral to seek higher education in this seminary and have nothing to do in the evenings but to go out in the streets of Islamabad.
`We initially studied in a seminary in Chitral but then came here to Jamia Faridia, because no seminary was offering higher education in Chitral,` Abdullah says as he leaves the madressah after Asar prayers.
`We will have free time to spend and relax a bit until Maghreb prayers and then we will return to the seminary,` he said.
Around three miles cast of Jamia Faridia, in sector F-6, up to 800 students of Jamia Muhammadia occupy a park in front of the Super Market commercial centre.
Soon after Asar prayers, they come out in the park and rest on the swings, benches and grass patches, leaving no room for other kids, particularly the girls and women living in the flats adjacent to the park.
`There was no madressah in my village in Tarbela Ghazi, so my father sent me here to become an Aalim (religious scholar),` says 15-year-old Huzaifa, who is in the first year batch of Jamia Muhammadia.
Like Huzaifa, Abdullah and Muhammad, there are over 15,000 students who have come to Islamabad to study in its religious seminaries. Incomparison there are hardly any local students from Islamabad who have joined these madressahs.
Intriguingly, organisations of all sects have built large seminaries in the federal capital, but none have established madressahs of this level in the areas from where the students actually hail.
`More than 90 per cent students in the 375 madressahs of Islamabad come from other citics. But this is a stupid question as to why these students come to study here. Islamabad is a city of outsiders and people in all departments have come from other cities,` says Maulana Abdul Quddus, a spokesman for Wifaq-ul-Madaris Al Arabia in Islamabad.
`It`s the government`s duty to provide high grade madressahs and schools in every nook and corner of the country. If they cooperate with us and establish high standard madressahs in other cities and facilitate them, students will not come to Islamabad for religious studies,` he says.
But Muhammad, a final year student of Jamia Faridia, believes there are financial reasons behind this.
`There are madressahs in our area in Chitral but they are not of this high level. The religious scholars don`t establish high grade madressahs in remote areas because they collect more funds from cities like Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi.
Moreover, life is easy here,` he said.
According to government statistics, there are a total of 329 madressahs in Islamabad, out ofwhich 175 are registered. Up to 16,000 students study in these madressahs but no official data has been maintained about the students who come from other cities.
On the other hand, around 250,000 students study in 422 formal government schools and up to 300,000 in 2,000 private schools including the high standard private schools affiliated with foreign universities. But hardly any students come from other cities to study in these schools.
Pervez Hoodbhoy, a senior professor formerly associated with Islamabad`s Quaid-i-Azam University, says that while the state originally provided space to religious elements in the federal capital during Gen Zia`s regime, those elements have now become much stronger and bring in people from outside to increase their power.
`If`a molvi gets a residence in a house associated with a mosque or madressah on a prime location in a city like Islamabad, he then brings in more and more people from outside to strengthen his hold.
`Over the years, they have now strengthened their street power in Islamabad. They can close down the city whenever they want to, and they have become accustomed to using this tool to blackmail the authorities. This is the reason they don`t establish large seminaries in other cities and have made Islamabad as their headquarter.
`But this has sufTocated the city, particularly for women who can`t move freely in the areas where madressahs exist. And children of`ten can`t go to parks because these madressah students have occupied most of`those.
Hoodbhoy also said that the madressah students have also forcibly snatched the citizens right of freedom of assembly on various occasions.
`I remember when we protested against a terrorist attack on the Hazara community in Quetta in front of the National Press Club, Islamabad two years ago, these students armed with clubs, bats and iron rods came there and attempted to attack us. Police had to intervene to save the protesters.`
Islamabad: from the outside
by Mirza Khurram Shahzad, dawn.com
Speaking in tongues - Terrorists
In 1857, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan began a reform programme for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, firmly believing that they would not be able to progress in society without the acquisition of Western education and sciences. Nearly one-and-a-half century later, madressahs in Pakistan believe the same.
`Without modern education, Muslims can`t survive, argues Attiqur Rehman Chohan, spokesman for the Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) in Peshawar. `The Dawa System of Education has been established to impart religious and modern education simultaneously. Our institutions are being set up across the country.
Notwithstanding the ban apparently imposed on them by the government as part of the National Action Plan against terrorism, the JuD is running about 30 English-medium schools in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It is believed that their schools network in Punjab is much larger. Perhaps the ban is only in name.
`Our organisation is introducing a curriculum that is currently taught at Atchison College, Lahore and at the University of Oxford. The programme will start in the first phase from Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad, and thereafter extended in other cities,` explains Chohan.
Thus far, the JuD has been training teachers who can instruct in the English language. Around 250 teachers in Islamabad have completed their training, but the JuD`s requirement is much larger. `We have planned to set up English-medium schools and colleges at divisional level.
Our network will then be extended to district and tehsil levels,` elaborates the spokesman.
In the past, religious organisations following different schools of thought focused on madressahs to produce their particular breed of cleric.
The trend has now shifted; the medium of instruction no longer needs to be a vernacular language or Arabic, while subjects taught are no longer restricted to theology. This process of establishing modern institutions, where students can be taught business, science and technology in the English language, has been underway since almost a decade.But this strategy is not born out of` the clerics` love l`or modern education; it is what they need to systematically propagate their ideology to a wider audience.
Most of these new English medium institutions are not restricted to schools either; well-off people affiliated with religious groups have set up vocational and technical colleges on the basis of sect. The number of English medium schools in the country has been increasing simply because religious groups have started their entry into modern education systems. The problem arises, however, when sectarian teachings become part of the curriculum in the guise of religious teachings.
Some sectarian groups also organise special coaching classes and tuition centres to prepare candidates to appear in competitive exams such as Central Superior Service (CSS) and provincial management service. `A religious group regularly arranges classes in Lahore for candidates who intend to take the CSS exams, so as to induct officersfrom their sect in the bureaucracy,` explains a source.
Given the number of sects and sectarian differences at play in Pakistan, almost all major players now run a growing network of modern educational institutions and madressahs in tandem.
The Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), which represents the Deobandi school of thought and has the largest network of madressahs in the country, runs private schools and colleges through the Sufa School System. `Retired teachers and professors ideologically infused by the JUI-F have been running this system in different areas, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,` claims the party`s provincial information secretary, Maulana Abdul Jalil Jan.
The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) too runs a separate body in Mansoora, Lahore, named Dar-i-Argam. This organisation manages the party`s affiliated chain of English-medium schools across the country. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa alone, the party has more than 150 private schools. Another two JT-affiliated syndicates, Hira and Iqra, have also their separate network of schools and colleges.
The Barelvi school of thought is not to be left behind either: they have a network of private schools that run under the supervision of four different bodies, AIMS Education System (AES), Mustafvi Model Schools, Muslim Hands and Minhajul Quran. These schools run in both the rural and the urban sectors.
Education experts and social commentators call the flourishing of parallel education systems a dangerous trend. The argument is that in the absence of a government-run uniform system of education, private educational institutions run by different schools of thought will systematically polarise Pakistani society, which is already reeling from the effects of sectarianism.
`Radical religious groups have already intruded into parliament and culture. Now they have planned to acquire managerial capabilities as well as the use of modern technology through their own English medium schools and higher education institutions,` says Professor Khadim Hussain, guest lecturer at the Linguistics Department, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. `They now want to accommodatetheir people in civil services, defence and other fields.
Prof Hussain explains that till a few years ago, the share of such groups in private education sector was about 25 per cent but now it has risen to more than 40pc. If the trend continues, he says, there will be an increase in `social isolation`.
The issue at heart for academics and educationists is not the increase in school buildings, but what is being taught in these buildings. One analyst describes the intervention of religious groups in education systems as something meant to indoctrinate children instead of educating them.
Speaking in tongues by Zulfiqar Ali dawn.com
Shikarpur`s sardar-madressa nexus by Manzoor Chandio
Alexander Burnes, the 19th century Scottish traveller and explorer, had a fascinating impression of the Shikarpuri. He was in Kabul, where he met Shikarpuri bankers who offered to provide him with hundis payable in Bukhara (Uzbekistan), Astrakhan (Russia), Nijni-Novgorod (Russia) or St Macaire (France).
Burnes took up their offer on Bukhara, and as he writes, `to [hisj complete satisfaction.
Burnes didn`t know at the time, but Shikarpur`s ancient trade and commerce network connected more than just Shikarpur and Kabul; it was the preferred route for merchants travelling from South Asia to Central Asia and vice versa throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.
Shikarpur still remains a link between Afghanistan and this part of the world, but for the wrong reasons. `The city is a known smuggling route between Afghanistan and Pakistan,` boomed Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan in the National Assembly. `Terrorists from Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa pass through Shikarpur to reach Karachi.
It emerged from the minister`s statement that the city`s ancient trade and commerce network has now been replaced by a terror network. Shikarpur that once exported a variety of goods to Central Asia now apparently imports terrorists from the region: per police claims, the January 30 blast in Shikarpur`s Imambargah Karbala Maula, which claimed the lives of over 60 people and injured over 80, was carried out by an Uzbek national. So far, four suicide bombers have blown themselves up in the district; most of them have been suspected to be Uzbeks from Central Asia.
But why would Uzbek militants head to Shikarpur, once the seat of secular and tolerant education? Din Mohammed Shaikh, former district coordinator for the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and a resident of the city, argues that most of these `aliens` arrive in Shikarpur because of some connection with the city`s local madressas.
`We have been noticing the increasing number of aliens in the area, who come in contact mostly with local madressas and live inside them,` says Shaikh.
Geographically, the district of Shikarpur borders Balochistan on the west and is connected to southern Punjab through Kashmore in the north. Till the early 1980s, there were only three madressas in Shikarpur. Perhaps nobody really ever felt the need for madressa education either, as modern education upheld the legacy of peace and harmony that was lived and practiced by Bhittai, Shah Inayat Shaheed, Sachal Sarmast and Sami Chen Rai.
`With the collapse of modern education system during the1980s, the city saw the mushrooming of madressas, which not only offered admission to outsiders but also doubled up as musafirkhanas (rest houses) for outsiders to the area,` narrates Shaikh.
`Today, there are about 200 madressas in Shikarpur district imparting religious education only in Arabic, Of the 200 madressas, 74 are unregistered,` Shaikh says while quoting a survey carried out by an NGO.
`An estimated 10,000 students are enrolled at these madressas, some 3,000 of them belong to other provinces while those from Sindh belong to upper Sindh districts,` he continues. `Within three decades, madressas have grown from three to 200. In comparison, there are only 150 formal schools, four colleges and one university campus in Shikarpur city.
The angst is not without reason: going by the growth pattern of madressas in the district, the number of formal schools is widely expected to be further dwarfed by the number of seminaries in the near future. With the closure of hundreds of government schools and the problem of goosro (absentee) teachers, parents prefer sending their children to madressas in the hopes of `free` education, clothing and food.
Members of Sindhi civil society argue that this phenomenon is a reflection of a larger clash: between old institutions, such as the sardari system and madressas, and new institu-tions, such as the formal education system and the business community. Since Sindh`s sardars are reluctant to let go of their clout, they have found new allies in madressa maulvis.
`It looks like the government deliberately wants to revive old institutions by strengthening the medieval jirga justice system and madressa education,` says Javed Qazi, a civil society activist from Karachi who led a delegation to Shikarpur after the Imambargah Karbala Maula tragedy.
`What we are seeing is a new partnership being cultivated between the sardars of Shikarpur and the maulvis. The sardars` old partners used to be the Barelvi shrines, but due to the non-expansionist nature of Sindh`s shrines, this partnership could not match the power-grabbing greed of Sindhi sardars,` argues Qazi. `For that reason, now we see new alignments in Sindhi society, with sardars establishing ties with Wahabi madressas. Both the old institutions are promoting each others` interests in the garb of tribalism and religion.
The government is largely absent from running madressaoperations, but some 40 registered madressas are funded by the Sindh government from its Zakat fund. Government officials, locals claim, don`t bother checking up on the condition of the government-funded madressas or even the quality of education and syllabus being taught.
Most madressas are run by Deobandi parties: the number of Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI-F)-run madressas is estimated to be around 125 in Shikarpur while the Jamaat-i-Islami runs 25 madressas. There are four seminaries from the Shia school of thought. Some madressas are run by clerics of the Ahl-i-Sunnat and Ahl-i-Hadith schools of thoughts.
Almost all madressas have mosques inside their compounds but the biggest problem is that mosques have all been tagged with a particular school of thought. Because of such associations, a common man dare not go inside `the house of God` which is operated by a rival sect.
`As compared to other parts of Sindh, Shikarpur has undergone a complete transformation and civil society has lost its say,` says a local resident, while talking on condition of anonymity. `A madressa administrator is more powerful if he has the blessings of the area sardar. The nexus between clan and sect has grown so strong that a Sunni sardar of Shikarpur allegedly chose to kill off his rival Shia sardar by sending a suicide bomber to attack him.
With politics and religion now tied in a relationship, explains Shikarpuri columnist Mumtaz Mangi, it soonbecame clear that most madressas in Shikarpur were constructed on grabbed land. `Madressas are operating like a mafia and grabbing empty government plots and open spaces along main roads. They are very good at collecting donations in the name of constructing a new madressa,` he says.
`Government authorities seem reluctant to control the expansion of madressas, since policemen were involved in grabbing land for many madressas,` alleges Mangi.
`Because of no government checks or monitoring system, some people with criminal backgrounds have also now established madressas and shelter their gangsters inside them.
They blackmail traders and extort money from them in the name of providing food to Talibs; but in fact, Talibs are sent to beg for food from houses. Donations and zakat money are gobbled up by madressa handlers,` Mangi explains.
Inside the madressas, only sect-based education is imparted to students while no employable skills are taught. In turn, those who graduate from one seminary tend to set up another sect-based seminary, since that is the only job they know.
Because only religious education is imparted at madressas, the Talibs began considering themselves as the protectors of faith, and put checks on citizens as if they were state actors.
This bred intolerance in society and disturbed any notions of peaceful coexistence, thereby also radicalising young people in the city.
Soon enough, Shikarpur began to see the social impact of this unchecked burgeoning of madressas.
`The city has often witnessed clashes over who becomes the peshimam. Those backed by powerful clans are sure to take over mosques,` argues Qazi. `Because of a lack of skills and unemployment, madressa-cducated peshimams defend their jobs at any cost and often indulge in violence to do so.
It`s a wrong assumption that madressas serve food and clothes to Talibs. Instead, most madressa Talibs depend on the generosity of the people of Shikarpur for food, cloth and medicines.
Then there is policing of cultural activities and citizens` personal lives.
`The frightening part is that Talibs have often been used to attack musical events and bodybuilding contests, which once were a regular feature of city life. The historical Mina Bazaar for women has been shut too after threats from madressa Talibs,` says Mangi.
Shaikh agrees, but adds that young people in Shikarpur are fast becoming radicalised because of the social engineering brought about by madressas. The regime of fear is such that residents of the city now believe that bands of club-wielding Talibs are ever ready to attack any social event they deem as un-Islamic.
`For that reason no musical programme has been held in the city for the last several years. The city`s Mina Bazaar has been closed for an indefinite period. Even nationalist parties like Qaumi Awami Tehrik of Palijo, Jeay Sindh groups and others have stopped holding Jashan-i-Latif, which they once used to hold every year,` says Shaikh.
The absence of cultural activities by Sindhi nationalist groups and the ruling party`s alleged involvement in grabbing power and money has created a vacuum: religious parties find Shikarpur to be an empty field, on which more madressas can be constructed, and over which they can establish their writ. It would be no exaggeration to say that extremists have created a pocket of terror in the heart of Sindh, with no action by the government and not much resistance from the civil society or political parties either.
Shikarpur`s sardar-madressa nexus
by Manzoor Chandio
The writer is a member of stag He tweets @manzoor chandio
Dawn.com

