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ISIS, Daesh, Boko Haram, Taliban - Illogical Logic of Terrorists to kill innocent people on name of Islam - Refuted

Takfiri Terrorists try to justify their immoral, illogical and un-Islamic rebellion against the Muslim states on the pretext of...

Monday, February 1, 2016

The real War against Terror is the war of Ideology, Narrative, Discourse


The closer you want to get to eradicating the menace of terrorism, the bigger this menace 
seems to get. After the attack in Peshawar, our leaders,  deliberated and deliberated. But this
piece is not about them and the solutions they might come up with. It is about the sociology of 
the mindset that either justifies or rationalises terrorism, or impedes tangible action against it. It is about the failure of the state and the society to come up with a narrative that can defeat the terrorists.
Terrorists of all hues — ISIS, [Daesh] Al Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and its 
countless affiliates, Afghan Taliban and its affiliates. India-focused terror groups like
 Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and sectarian terror groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi — use two 
weapons: incredible hatred towards their victims and a narrative to convince and recruit
 new supporters to the cause. Keep Reading >>>>>>

Related :

Jihad, Extremism

    Saturday, January 23, 2016

    Non implimentaion of Sharia , Ruler and Islam (Urdu)

    شریعت نافذ نہ کرنے والا حکمران اور دائرئہ اسلام!

    Image result for sharia terrorism
    عراق کے شہر کوفہ کی جامع مسجد میں حضرت علیؓ کے گھر کا دروازہ کھلتا تھا۔ امیر المؤمنین یہیںسے مسجد میں تشریف لایا کرتے تھے۔ سترہ رمضان کو جب آپ فجر کی نماز پڑھانے گھر کے دروازے سے مسجد میں داخل ہوئے اور انہیں دیکھتے ہی نماز کے قیام کی تکبیر بلند ہوئی تو شبیب ملعون نے تلوار کا وار کر دیا۔ امیرالمؤمنینؓ گر پڑے تو ملعون ابن ملجم مرادی تیزی سے آگے بڑھا،حملہ آور ہوا تو حضرت علیؓ کے سر مبارک اور ماتھے پر تلوار کا وار پڑا۔ حملہ کرتے ہوئے ملعون نے جو جملہ کہا وہ قابل غور ہے۔ کہنے لگا: ''اَلْحُکْمُ لِلّٰہِ لَا لَکَ یَا عَلِیْ وَلَا لِاَصْحَابِکَ‘‘ اے علی حکم اللہ کا ہے، نہ تیرا ہے اور نہ تیرے ساتھیوں کا ہے (تاریخ ابن خلدون ج 2ص 617) قارئین کرام! غور فرمایئے! حضرت علیؓ نبوی راستے پر قائم خلیفہ راشد ہیں۔ ان کی حکمرانی میں کامل طور پر شریعت کا قانون نافذ تھا۔ اس کے باوجود اس دور کے خارجیوں نے ان پر معاذ اللہ، اللہ کی حاکمیت سے نکل جانے کا الزام عائد کر دیا اور کفر کا فتویٰ لگا کر گردن زدنی قرار دے دیا اور پھر شہید کرتے ہوئے اپنے تکفیری اور خارجی نظریے کے حامل نعرے کا اعلان بھی کر دیا۔ اس سے اندازہ لگایا جا سکتا ہے کہ باقی حکمرانوں کی ان کے ہاں کیا حیثیت ہو گی؟ خاص طور پر آج کے مسلم حکمرانوں کو ایسے خارجی لوگ کیا سمجھیں گے، بخوبی اندازہ لگایا جا سکتا ہے۔ اب ہم ان کی گمراہ سوچ کا جائزہ لیں گے کہ کتاب و سنت کی روشنی میں ایسی رائے اور سوچ کی کیا حیثیت ہے؟ 
    سب سے پہلے ہم ان آیات کا ترجمہ لکھ رہے ہیں، جن کو سامنے رکھتے ہوئے خارجی ذہنیت کے لوگ مسلمان حکمرانوں کو کافر قرار دے کر دائرئہ اسلام سے خارج کرتے ہیں اور پھر مرتد ہو جانے کا فتویٰ لگا کر گردن زدنی قرار دیتے ہیں، پھر بغاوت کرتے ہوئے عسکری گروپ تشکیل دیتے ہیں اور حملے کر کے ارتداد کی سزا دیتے ہوئے خوش ہوتے ہیں کہ انہوں نے قرآن پر عمل کر دیا ہے۔ اللہ فرماتے ہیں: اور جو لوگ اللہ کے اتارے ہوئے احکامات کے مطابق فیصلے نہ کریں وہی کافر ہیں۔ (المائدہ: 44) اسی طرح اگلی آیت میں اللہ نے ایسے لوگوں کو ظالم قرار دیا اور پھر اسی سورت کی آیت نمبر 47میں اللہ تعالیٰ نے ایسے لوگوں کو فاسق قرار دیا۔
    قارئین کرام! سورۃ المائدہ جس میں مندرجہ بالا تین آیات موجود ہیں وہاں اللہ تعالیٰ نے یہودیوں اور مسیحی لوگوں کا تذکرہ کیا ہے اور ان پر اتاری گئی الہامی کتابوں تورات اور انجیل کا ذکر فرمایا ہے۔ ان آیات کی شرح اور تفسیر میں بخاری اور مسلم کی جو احادیث ہیں، مفسرین نے ان کا تذکرہ کیا ہے۔ ہم طوالت کے خوف سے وہ احادیث درج نہیں کر رہے۔ مفسرین نے ان کا ذکر کر کے یہی بتلایا ہے کہ یہودیوںنے رجم کی سزا کو بھی بدل دیا تھا اور قتل کے بدلے میں دیت کی رقم میں بھی امتیاز قائم کر دیا تھا کہ طاقتور اگر کمزور قبیلے کے شخص کو قتل کر دیتا تو دیت یعنی خون بہانے کی رقم آدھی لی جاتی تھی اور اگر کمزور کے ہاتھوں طاقتور قبیلے کا آدمی قتل ہو جاتا تو خون بہا یعنی دیت کی پوری رقم وصول کی جاتی تھی۔ یہ طرزِ عمل تورات میں درج قانون کے صریحاً خلاف تھا لہٰذا اللہ تعالیٰ نے ایسی تبدیلی کرنے والوں کو کافر، ظالم اور فاسق کہا اور یہ تبدیلی کرنے والے یہودونصاریٰ کے علماء اور حکمران تھے۔ نیز ان کے کفر کی سب سے بڑی اور بنیادی وجہ تو یہ تھی کہ تورات اور انجیل میں حضرت محمد کریمﷺ کا واضح ذکر تھا کہ آپ آخری رسولؐ ہیں، اس کے باوجود ان لوگوں نے تورات اور انجیل کی بات کو نہیں مانا اور اس سلسلے میں بھی تبدیلی اور تحریف کی اور حضورؐ کی نبوت و رسالت کا انکار کر دیا۔ یہ تھا ان کے کفر کا اصلی اور بنیادی سبب۔ چنانچہ اللہ کے رسولؐ کے معروف صحابی حضرت براء بن عازبؓ واضح کرتے ہیں کہ کافر، ظالم اور فاسق قرار دینے والی تینوں آیات کا تعلق ''ہی فِی الْکُفَّارِ کُلِّھَا‘‘ سب کا سب غیر مسلم لوگوں سے ہے۔ (مسند احمد: 18724)
    قارئین کرام! مندرجہ بالا تینوں آیات کی تفسیر معلوم کرنے کے لئے جب ہم نے تفسیر ابن کثیر کو دیکھا تو امام ابن کثیر رحمہ اللہ آگاہ فرماتے ہیں کہ بڑے بڑے صحابہؓ جن میں حضرت براء بن عازب، حضرت حذیفہؓ بن یمان اور حضرت عبداللہ بن عباسؓ جیسے مفسر کہ جن کے فہم قرآن میں اضافہ کے لئے اللہ کے رسولؐ نے دعا فرمائی وہ سب یہی فرماتے ہیں کہ کافر والی آیت اہل کتاب کے بارے میں نازل ہوئی ہے۔ بعد کے مفسرین اور موجودہ دور کے نامور مفسرین بھی اپنی تفاسیر میں اسی مؤقف کا اظہار کرتے اور لکھتے نظر آتے ہیں۔ حضرت عبداللہ بن عباسؓ مزید فرماتے ہیں کہ جو شخص اللہ کے نازل کردہ حکم کو ماننے سے انکارکر دے اس نے کفر کیا اور وہ حکمران جو اقرار کرتا ہے مگر اللہ کے نازل کردہ احکام کے مطابق فیصلے نہیں کرتا، تنقید نہیں کرتا، وہ ظالم اور فاسق ہے۔ ثابت ہوا موجودہ حکمران جو شریعت کے مطابق فیصلے نہیں کرتے، تنفیذ نہیں کرتے، وہ گنہگار ہیں۔ ظلم کا ارتکاب تو کرتے ہیں، فسق یعنی گناہ سے دوچار تو ہوتے ہیں مگر مسلمان ہیں۔ خارجی لوگ یا خارجی ذہنیت سے متاثر لوگ جو ایسے گنہگار حکمرانوں کو کافر قرار دیتے ہیں وہ جہالت، لاعلمی اور حماقت کا اظہار کرتے ہیں۔ اور خارجیوں کا طرز عمل یہی ہے کہ وہ مسلمانوں کو گناہوں کی وجہ سے کافر قرار دے دیتے ہیں اور دائرئہ اسلام سے فوراً باہر کر دیتے ہیں۔ ایسے لوگوں کے بارے میں امام محمد بن اسماعیل بخاری رحمہ اللہ اپنی صحیح بخاری میں آگاہ کرتے ہیں کہ وہ آیات جو کافروں سے متعلق ہیں بعض لوگ ان آیات کو مسلمانوں پر لاگو کر دیتے ہیں اسی سے فتنہ پیدا ہوتا ہے۔
    قارئین کرام! قرآن و حدیث کے مطابق اسلاف کا طریقہ یہ ہے کہ گناہ گار مسلمان حکمرانوں کو نصیحت کی جائے، ان کا احترام ملحوظ خاطر رکھتے ہوئے انہیں سمجھایا جائے، اللہ کا خوف دلایا جائے۔ آج کے دور میں یہ بھی کہا جا سکتا ہے کہ پرامن احتجاج کر لیا جائے، کالم اور کتابیں لکھی جائیں، ملاقات کر کے اپنا فرض ادا کیا جائے جیسا کہ قیام پاکستان کے بعد ہمارے علماء کرتے آئے ہیں لیکن کفر کے فتوے لگانا، بغاوت کرنا اور عسکری گروپ بنا کر حملے کرنا یہ خارجیت ہے اور دہشت گردی کی بدترین روش ہے۔ یہ بغاوت ہے اور اسے کچلنا اور اس کی سرکوبی کرنا مسلمان حکمرانوں کی ڈیوٹی ہے، شرعی فریضہ ہے۔ وہ یہ شرعی فریضہ ادا نہ کریں گے تو گناہ گار ہوں گے۔ مسلمانوں کی ریاست، ان کی حفاظت اور جان ومال سب فتنے سے دوچار ہو جائیں گی لہٰذا ضرب عضب بالکل درست فیصلہ ہے۔ اس فیصلے سے خارجی فتنے کا قلع قمع ہوا ہے۔ دنیا میں میاں نوازشریف اور پاک فوج کے سالار راحیل شریف کے کردار کو نیک نامی ملی ہے
    - See more at: http://dunya.com.pk/index.php/author/ameer-hamza/2016-01-22/14107/50330002#tab2

    Related :

    Jihad, Extremism

      Wednesday, January 13, 2016

      The Muslim Extremist Discourse: Constructing Us Versus Them

      This unique book analyzes the discourse of militant organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda. It interrogates the discourse of these extremist organizations, which publish their own newspapers. These publications, widely distributed to the local population, play a critical role in securing and maintaining public support for the militant organizations. The book examines how these organizations discursively construct the socio-political reality of their world, in the process defining the Self and the Other. The Self becomes umma, or the global Muslim community, while the Other becomes the West, including the United States, Israel, and India. This book presents an analysis of three historical moments the assassination of al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden, the controversial YouTube video Innocence of the Muslims, and the shooting of the Pakistani child activist and Nobel Laureate Malala Yousafzai. This analysis reveals the discursive strategies used by the militant organizations to create what Foucault calls regimes of truth and articulate identities of the Self and the Other. The first of its kind, this book provides an insight into the mind-set of extremists. It presents a picture of the world that extremists construct through their own discourse and explains how extremists try to win the hearts and minds of mainstream Muslims in order to expand their support base, seek donations, and find new recruits. Understanding extremist narratives and the ways they feed the broader militant discourse may yield more meaningful and effective strategies for the West to communicate with mainstream Muslims."
      "The Muslim Extremist Discourse: Constructing Us Versus Them" By Faizullah Jan
      http://tribune.com.pk/story/1026947/the-militant-discourse/
      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      The militant discourse

      By Ayesha Siddiqa

      The Chinese want foolproof security to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The primary reason being, the protection of their citizens. Since Beijing tends to use its own manpower for all the projects it is involved in with hardly any share in employment for Pakistan, security is of prime importance. But China has less to worry about as the militant and religious right wing in Pakistan views it far more kindly than it does the West. In fact, it is rare to come across any mention of China in right-wing publications despite the knowledge that Muslims in Xinjiang are not the happiest in the world and face tough conditions.

      Interestingly, Pakistan’s militant and right-wing media in general focuses on the West as an enemy. According to Faizullah Jan, who teaches at Peshawar University and has come out with a fantastic study of militant discourse in the country, the West is perceived as the “far enemy”, which is out there to destroy Muslims, especially of Pakistan. In his recently published book, The Muslim Extremist Discourse, he has looked at the extremist’s conceptualisation of the self and the other in the war on terror. Jan has systematically examined numerous publications of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the Jamaatud Dawaa (JuD) to understand their worldview as reflected in the debate over three events: a) the operation to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad; b) the ban on YouTube in Pakistan due to the presence of an anti-Islam film on the website; and c) the shooting of Malala Yousufzai. The author has correctly pointed out the significance of narratives, which are critical tools to create a social reality that is then marketed amongst the clientele of a group or party.

      It is important to examine the extremist discourse because not only is it a good measure to gauge the perspective of militants, it also fosters the realisation, as Jan points out, that this narrative will exist beyond the end of the war on terror. In fact, this literature is central to radicalism, which feeds violent extremism in the country and amongst Muslim communities. But this literature is not exclusive as it is not present in total isolation from the mainstream media discourse (particularly in Urdu), which has begun to echo an almost similar perspective on numerous issues, certainly on the three events cited above.

      One of the key points of extremist literature is focused on presenting the West as the negative, the enemy or the ‘other’ that must be fought. This is a common theme that runs through the description and debate over the three events, which Jan categorises as ‘three moments’. Hence, we see that despite some of the jihadi media’s initial reaction of even sympathising with Malala Yousufzai after the attack on her or reminding people that Islam forbids attacks against women and children, the tone changes quickly and she begins to be presented as an enemy agent or as an excuse used by Americans to attack Muslim Pakistan. The shift in how an event is portrayed is also obvious from how OBL’s killing is described. While the initial reaction is to deny that such a thing ever happened, this is followed by a tirade against the US. Later, OBL’s killing is described as the epitome of martyrdom and his description then takes the form of myth-building in which he is presented as Arab royalty, who like Buddha, abandoned the comforts of his home and hearth to lay down his life in order to protect Islam. Furthermore, OBL is also likened to a Sufi and majnun (a great lover). Referring to similarities with historical characters, is done as part of necessary myth-building that gives the believer a feeling of reliving the early days of Islam. One wonders if that is because Muslims of the subcontinent were, historically, converts from Buddhism, Hinduism or Sikhism and that is why the image of historical characters is sometimes resurrected like deities. Every other militant appears to take the name of a companion of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) or the early commanders of Islam to give him a sense of being part of history.

      A parallel theme that we see running through publications like the Urdu daily Jasarat, the JeM’s Al-Qalam and Zarb-e-Momin, the JI’s daily Islam, the JuD’s Jarrar, or Al-Rashid Trust’s Al-Amin is the presentation of rulers and the leadership as the ‘near enemy’. According to Jan’s analysis, the theme of financial, political and moral corruption of rulers is a pervasive one. Not that militants have to struggle a lot to convince their readers of this, but there is a very systematic description of rulers as people ‘who have sold out their conscience for dollars’, and help the US ‘violate our sovereignty by carrying out drone attacks’. Although not mentioned by Jan, a large part of the same literature denounces democracy as an unacceptable and corrupt system. The hatred for democracy, in fact, is a common thread which runs through the literature produced by al Qaeda, JuD and JeM. The religious wings and sectarian groups, which these violent extremists are ideologically linked with, have a similar narrative. But more importantly, liberal intellectuals in Muslim countries are also equated with the ‘near enemy’, and hence a threat to Muslim identity.

      The natural progression of the above argument is the enforcing of a caliphate that would represent the rule of believers. The denunciation of the existing political system is critical in establishing logic for a utopia, based on an Islamic system that espouses the idea of justice for all. Therefore, the identity of the ‘favoured’ Muslim and the militant is crafted carefully. This was most obvious from the way in which militant literature hid the identity of those who attacked Malala Yousufzai. This was to ensure that any sympathy for the young girl may not turn people against the Taliban who had attacked her.

      Interestingly, despite the common threads found in all extremist discourse, the Pakistani state tends to distinguish between the good and the bad extremist. Such an attitude ignores the power of discourse and how it is changing the way people think about the ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies and friends. The need for a counter-narrative is urgent.
      By Ayesha Sidiqah
      Tribune Express

      Thursday, January 7, 2016

      War Against Militant Islam- the Ideological Frontiers

        Image result for War Against Takfiri Ideology
      It all started in 1979 when the then Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. The US, the rival superpower, engaged the local traditional Muslims and many others who volunteered from outside Afghanistan to fight the invading army to throw them out. In the process they trained the local people in the art of modern military warfare, equipped them with military hardware, and called them the Afghan fighters of the holy war (Afghan Mujahidin). The US achieved its purpose of ousting USSR from Afghanistan culminating in the collapse of the Soviet empire. Both parties, the US and Afghan Mujahidin, were supremely confident that since they had defeated a super power, they had become invincible. In this war, they were ably supported by Pakistan who provided them the ideology, the manpower and the training ground for these Mujahidin.

      The Afghan Mujahidin did not fight the Soviet army for the love of Americans. Their fight was a holy war for them which had its roots in their religious narrative that urged them to fight non-Muslim enemies until the entire globe was conquered for establishing the political authority of Islam. Not long after the collapse of Soviet Union, the Taliban established the first model of what they thought was the ideal Islamic state in accordance with their narrative. When a group of people caused 9/11 to happen and the US invaded Afghanistan on the plea that the alleged chief instigator, Osama bin Laden, was given protection by the Taliban government, the religious narrative was challenged. The Taliban took it as a further opportunity to realize their ideal. From then on, they are fighting, going by their religious understanding, the Kafir Americans who conquered their land and destroyed the Islamic regime in Afghanistan. Their first goal is to oust the Americans from Afghanistan and the next, bigger one, is to convert the entire globe into an Islamic state by invading it through Jihad (holy war). The fallout of that war in Pakistan is not coincidental. TTP is the Pakistani version of the group inspired by the same ideology.

      The narrative the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani counterparts are striving to realize is taught in the religious seminaries of Pakistan in a way that the Muslim world is described as Darul-Islam (or Darul-Salam, the land of peace) and the rest as Darul-Harb (the land of war). This war will continue according to the narrative until all territories of the world are subjugated and made Darul-Islam. A similar narrative was forcefully presented by Mawlana Maududi and his followers and Dr Israr Ahmad in the later half of the twentieth century. They quoted verses after verses from the Qur’an to show that the purpose of a believer’s life in this world was to ensure supremacy of God’s law over the entire globe. His task would remain incomplete until that goal is realized. Neither of them wanted their narrative to be realized through military adventurism of such devastating proportions as the TTP is doing. In fact, Jama’at e Islami decided after the creation of Pakistan to achieve that goal democratically. Dr Israr Ahmad resigned from the Jama’at in protest, declaring it as a deviation from the ideal Mawlana Maududi himself presented. No matter what these scholars had in mind, military adventurism of the Taliban has its ideological roots in their works.

      The soldiers who are fighting for TTP are therefore convinced that what they are doing is the noblest of the causes their religion has taught them. They are engaged in a holy war (Jihad). But the narrative is not believed in by the Taliban alone. A substantial number of religious Pakistanis are influenced by the same approach. The non-combatant sympathizers are put off sometimes by the barbaric killing of the innocent civilians by the Taliban. Many of them also disagree with suicide bombing as a tactic for achieving this goal. Some also dispute their strategy of achieving their end by fighting fellow Muslims. But the ideal of ensuring supremacy of Islamic law one way or the other is shared by many as an undisputed ideal.

      The war against the Taliban is therefore not going to be a simple affair. It has both military and ideological dimensions. The latter too has to be fought resolutely by presenting convincing arguments to show that the concept of Darul Harb is absurd, dangerous, and un-Islamic. It needs to be clarified that the battles fought against the non-believers at the time of the Prophet alaihissalam were mostly divine punishments for the people who rejected the messenger of God despite knowing him to be the true representative of God. The Qur’anic verses referring to those battles have nothing to do with later times. 
      It also needs to be clarified that the task of introducing Islamic Shari’ah is not the direct responsibility of the masses. The elected representatives need to introduce it through mutual consultation. Muslims need to be convincingly reminded that fighting against Muslim rulers is not Jihad (a holy war); instead, it is fasad fil ard (mischief on earth). And above all, they should be made to realize that killing one soul is as big a crime as killing the entire humanity. Arguments for all these ideas are firmly rooted in the Qur’an.

      If the outcome of the war against TTP is to be positive, it will have to be fought as much on the ideological frontier as it needs to be fought on the military front. No army can fight a war convincingly if it is fighting an enemy who enjoys considerable sympathies of many of its own soldiers and civilians.

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        Sunday, January 3, 2016

        Reading Maududi in dystopia

                 
        Abul Ala Maududi (d.1979), is considered to be one of the most influential Islamic scholars of the 20th century. He is praised for being a highly pro-lific and insightful intellectual and author who creatively contextualised the political role of Islam in the last century, and consequently gave birth to what became known as `Political Islam.
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        Simultaneously, his large body of work was also severely critiqued as being contradictory and for being an inspiration to those bent on committing violence in the name of faith.Interestingly, Maududi`s theories and commentaries received negative criticism not only from those on the left and liberal sides of the divide, but from some of his immediate religious contemporaries as well.
        [Article By Nadeem F Paacha, Dawn.com]

        Nevertheless, his thesis on the state, politics and Islam, managed to influence a number of movements within and outside of Pakistan.

        For example, the original ideologues of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood organisation (that eventually spread across the Arab world), were directly influenced by Maududi`s writings.

        Maududi`s writings also influenced the rise of `Islamic` regimes in Sudan in the 1980s, and more importantly, the same writings were recycled by the Ziaul Haq dictatorship (1977-88), to indoctrinate the initial batches of Afghan insurgents (the `mujahideen`), fighting against Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan.

        In the last century, the modern Islamic Utopia that Maududi was conceptualising had become the main motivation behind several political and ideological experiments in various Muslim countries.

        Image result for maududi quotes

        However, 21st century polities (in the Muslim world) is not according to the kind enthusiastic reception that Maududi`s ideas received in the second half of the 20th century.By the early 2000s, almost all experiments based on Maududi`s ideas seemed to have collapsed under their own weight. The imagined Utopia turned into a living dystopia, torn apart by mass level violence (perpetrated in the name of faith) and the gradual retardation of social and economic evolution in a number of Muslim countries,including Pakistan.

        This is ironic. Because when compared to the ultimate mindset that his ideas seemed to have ended up planting within various mainstream regimes and clandestine groups, Maududi himself sounds rather broad-minded.

        Born in 1903 in Aurangabad, India, Maududi`s intellectual evolution is a fascinating story of a man who, after facing bouts of existential crises, chose to interpret Islam as a political theory to address his own spiritual and ideological impasses.

        He did not come raging out of a madressah, swinging a fist at the vulgarities of the modern world. On the contrary, he was born into a family that had relations with the enlightened 19th century Muslim reformist and scholar, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan.

        Maududi received his early education at home through private tutors who taught him the Quran, Hadith, Arabic and Persian. At age 12, Maududi was sent to the Oriental High School whose curriculum had been arranged by famous Islamic scholar, Shibli Nomani.

        Maududi was studying at a collegelevel Islamic institution, the Darul Aloom, when he had to rush to Bhopal to look after his ailing father. In Bhopal, he befriended the rebellious Urdu poet and writer, Niaz Fatehpuri.

        Fatehpuri`s writings and poetry werehighly critical of the orthodox Muslim clergy. This had left him fighting polemical battles with the ulema.

        Inspired by Fatchpuri, Maududi too decided to become a writer. In 1919, the then 17-year-old Maududi moved to Delhi, where for the f`irst time he began to study the works of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan in l`ull. This, in turn, led Maududi to study the major works of philosophy, sociology, history and politics authored by leading European thinkers and writers.

        In 1929, after resurfacing from his vigorous study of`Western philosophical and political thought, Maududi published his f`irst major book, Al-Jihad FilIslam. The book is largely a lament on the state of`Muslim society in India and in it he attacked the British, modernist Muslims and the orthodox clergy for combining to keep Indian Muslims subdued and weak.

        Writing in flowing, rhetorical Urdu, Maududi criticised the Muslim clergy for keeping Muslims away from the study of Western philosophy and science.

        Maududi suggested that it were these that were at the heart of Western political and economic supremacy and needed to be studied so they could then be effectively dismantled and replaced by an `Islamic society` In 1941 Maududi formed the Jamaat-iIslami (JI). The outfit was shaped on the Leninist model of forming a `party of a select group of committed and knowl-edgeable vanguards` who would attempt to grab state power through revolution.

        In an essay that was later republished (in 1980) in a compilation of his writings, Come let us Change This World, Maududi castigated the ulema for `being stuck in the past` and thus halting the emergence of new research and thinking in the field of Islamic scholarship.

        He was equally critical of modernist Muslims (including Mohammad Ali Jinnah). In the same essay he lambasted them for understanding Islam through concepts constructed by the West and for believing that religion was a private matter.

        Though an opponent of Jinnah and the creation of Pakistan (because he theorised that an `Islamic State` could not be enacted by `Westernised Muslims`), Maududi did migrate to the new Muslim-majority country once it came into being in 1947.

        In a string of books, mainly Khilafato-Malukiyat, Deen-i-Ilag, Islamic Law and Constitution and Economic System of fslam, Maududi laid out his precepts of the modern-day `Islamic State` He was adamant about the need to gain state power to impose his principles of an Islamic State, but cautioned that the society first needed to be Islamised from below (through evangelical action), for such a state to begin imposing Islamic Laws.

        In these books he was the first Islamic scholar to use the term `Islamic ideolo-gy` (in a political context). The term was later rephrased as `Political Islam` by the western scholarship on the subject.

        In 1977 when Maududi agreed to support the Ziaul Haq dictatorship, he was criticised for attempting to grab state power through a Machiavellian military dictator.

        Maududi`s decision sparked an intense critique of his ideas by the modernist Islamic scholar, Dr Fazal Rehman Malik. In his book, Islam and Modernity, Dr Malik described Maududi as a populist journalist, rather than a scholar. Malik suggested that Maududi`s writings were `shallow` and crafted only to bag the attention of muddled young men craving for an imagined faith-driven Utopia.

        Maududi`s body of work is remarkable in its proficiency and creativity. And indeed, it is also contradictory. He used Western political concepts of the state to explain the modern idea of the Islamic State; and yet he accused modernist Muslims of understanding Islam throughWestern constructs. He saw no space for monarchies in Islam, yet was entirely uncritical of conservative Arab monarchies. He would often prefix the word Islam in front of various Western economic and political ideas (IslamicEconomics, Islamic-Banking and Islamic-Constitution) and yet he reacted aggressively towards the idea of `Islamic-Socialism` that came from his leftist opponents in the 1960s.

        Writing in the Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, Political Anthropologist, Professor Irfan Ahmed, suggested that there was not one Maududi, but many.

        He wrote that elements of Leninism, Hegel`s dualism, Jalaluddin Afghani`s Pan-Islamism and various other modern political theories can be found in Maududi`s thesis.

        Perhaps this is why Maududi`s ideas managed to appeal to various sections of the urban Muslim middle-classes; modern conservative Muslim movements; and all the way to the more anarchic and reactionary forces.

        But the question is, had Maududi been alive today, which one of the many Maududis would he have been most comfortable with in a Muslim world now crammed with raging dystopias? 
        [Article By Nadeem F Paacha, Dawn.com]

        Interpretation of Islam and the "Islamic State":
        At least one critic (Charles Adams) argues that Maududi was "feared" and "disliked" by many Pakistanis because of the "rigidity" and "authoritarianism" his of view of Islam as a "vast monolithic ... integrated system" that Muslims must accept "in its entirety or not at all".
        A general complaint of one critic (Youssef M. Choueiri) is that Maududi's theo-democracy is an
        ideological state in which legislators do not legislate, citizens only vote to reaffirm the permanent applicability of God's laws, women rarely venture outside their homes lest social discipline be disrupted, and non-Muslims are tolerated as foreign elements required to express their loyalty by means of paying a financial levy.
        Charles Adams criticized Maududi as overly concerned with theoretical principles, having a "utopian" belief in the power of virtue to tame the corruption and temptations of power,  and to solve whatever problems beset a society.Adams complained that Maududi never "enters into a detailed discussion of the precise limits of freedom in the Islamic state or explain how a state may both control everything and yet be limited in its power in certain respects."  While God's sovereignty is in the hands of the Muslim people in his theory, his plan for an Islamic state puts the power in the hands of the ruler. Maududi never provided an explanation as to how this would prevent the development of tyranny he sees in secular government. When his ideas were criticized for failure to solve the real day-to-day problems of building a functional government, he would reply by defending "the truth of Islam", implying his (Muslim) critics were criticizing Islam.
        Adams also finds the "closeness and lack of friction" between ruler and legislature that Maududi envisioned in his state unrealistic. Ruler and legislature would be in agreement, and there would be no opposition to the ruler so long as he "did what was right", while "the entire parliament" would become the opposition party if the ruler deviated from the straight path. Maududi himself admitted the visionary and ideal nature of much of his Islamic state. More than once he spoke of characteristics that were "realizable only in the context of an ideal Islamic society which does not now exist."
        Adams criticized the power Maududi puts in the virtue and vice, rather than political interests, expertise or other attributes. Whenever injustice and suffering exist in a society it is because the leadership prefers this state of affairs or doesn't care. They will be ended by a good, pious, moral Muslim man implementing sharia law, whatever the physical, social economic or other difficulties of a society.
        Scholar Vali Nasr questions Maududi's idea that Muslims have not been following Islam for almost the entirety of Muslim history, but that "the history of Islam would resume, after a fourteen-century interlude", if Muslim follow Maududi's teachings and establish his Islamic state. Nasr also questioned how popular interests or the popular will would be translated into government policy without competition among political representatives for popular support or electioneering/campaigning for votes to connect leaders with concerns of the people.
        On a more conceptual level, journalist and author Abdelwahab Meddeb questions the basis of Maududi's reasoning that the sovereignty of the truly Islamic state must be divine and not popular, saying "Maududi constructed a coherent political system, which follows wholly from a manipulation." The manipulation is of the Arabic word hukm, usually defined as to "exercise power as governing, to pronounce a sentence, to judge between two parties, to be knowledgeable (in medicine, in philosophy), to be wise, prudent, of a considered judgment." The Quran contains the phrase `Hukm is God's alone,` thus, according to Maududi, God – in the form of sharia law – must govern. But Meddeb argues that a full reading of the ayah where the phrase appears reveals that it refers to God's superiority over pagan idols, not His role in government.
        Those whom you follow outside of Him are nothing but names that you and your fathers have given them. God has granted them no authority. Hukm is God's alone. He has commanded that you follow none but Him. Such is the right religion, but most people do not know. [Quran 12:40]
        Quranic "commentators never forget to remind us that this verse is devoted to the powerlessness of the companion deities (pardras) that idolaters raise up next to God…" (Abdel Meddab's view is contradicted by Wahhabi Islamic scholars such as Saleh Al-Fawzan, who writes that: "He who accepts a law other than Allah's ascribes a partner to Allah. Whatever act of worship that is not legislated (hukam) by Allah and His Messenger is Bid‘ah, and every Bid'ah is a means of deviation." [From Wikipedia:]
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